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The American Death Penalty and the
(In)Visibility of Race
Carol S. Steikert & Jordan M Steikertt
Racial injustice has always cast a shadow over American criminaljustice. In
the context of capital punishment, racial disparitieshave been evident since colonial times. Black people have suffered not only disparatetreatment as allegedperpetrators and victims of capital crimes under facially neutral capital statutes, but
also explicit racialdiscriminationunder antebellum capital statutes that varied in
their application based on the racial status of victims and perpetrators.Following
the Civil War, blacks suffered a lengthy era in which lynchings were common, followed by an era of so-called legal lynchings in the South, in which legalprotections
were minimal at best. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund led the constitutional-litigationcampaign
against the death penalty in the 1960s and 1970s. What is surprising,however, is
the Supreme Court's avoidance of the race issue in its foundational constitutional
cases. Despite the centrality of racial discrimination in litigants' arguments, the
Court consistently avoided direct engagement with the issue of racialdiscrimination in capital punishment. After surveying the centrality of race both to the history
of capital punishment in America and to the litigants' constitutionalstrategy, we
document the Court's strategies of avoidance. We then considerpossible explanations for the Court's silence and note some unanticipated consequences of the
Court's race-neutral approach to its constitutional regulation of capital
punishment.

INTRODUCTION

Sometimes the historical context in which important constitutional doctrines are born or elaborated may influence deciding
judges in subtle, perhaps even unconscious, ways. Consider, for
example, how the Cold War imperative for the recognition of the
civil rights of black Americans may have affected midcentury
court rulings on racial equality' or how the intrusive policing of

t Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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We thank Mara Sacks and Chris Havasy of Harvard Law School for excellent research assistance.
1 See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality 210 (Oxford 2004) ('The justices' unanimity in all three
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gay men in public lavatories may have influenced consideration
of the constitutionality of the bugging of phone booths and other
forms of surveillance.2 Arguments that these background events
influenced constitutional law are necessarily speculative given
that the salience of the events may have lurked below the level
of consciousness.
The racial context informing the foundational constitutional
challenges to capital punishment is different. The justices who
"constitutionalized" the death penalty in the 1960s and 1970s
could not have avoided consciously reflecting on the racial history of capital punishment in America, given that the constitutional campaign against the death penalty was led by the nation's preeminent racial-justice organization, the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund (LDF). During this time, the litigants and their amici consistently thrust the issue of race to the
forefront, and nobody with even a modicum of historical awareness could have missed the salience of race to the American
practice of capital punishment.
Strangely, though, the birth of the Supreme Court's constitutional regulation of capital punishment was largely devoid of
mention of the racially inflected history of the law and practice
of the death penalty, despite how central the issue of race was to
the litigation effort that forced the Court's hand. One can read
the entire canon of the Court's pathbreaking cases on capital
punishment during the 1960s and 1970s without getting the impression that the death penalty was an issue of major racial significance in American society.
In what follows, we highlight how inextricably race and the
death penalty have been entwined in American history, survey
the near absence of discussions of race in the Supreme Court's
formative Eighth Amendment cases of the 1960s and 1970s, and
contemplate the possible causes and costs of this strange
strategy of willful silence.

1950 race cases-an impressive accomplishment for this ordinarily splintered Court-is
most plausibly attributable to the Cold War imperative.").
2
See David Alan Sklansky, "One Train May Hide Another" Katz, Stonewall, and
the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 UC Davis L Rev 875, 880, 897-900 (2008)
(contending that the Court's landmark decision in Katz v United States, 389 US 347
(1967), and the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that flowed from it were influenced by
the justices' anxieties, perhaps unconscious, about the use of peepholes and undercover
decoys to police gay men's encounters in public lavatories).

2015] The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibilityof Race

245

I. VISIBILITY
It is impossible to find a time in American history, even well
before the birth of the Republic, when the use of the death penalty was not racially inflected. Even in seventeenth-century
colonial America, a frontier society in which overall populations
were small and black inhabitants few, the rate of execution of
blacks still far exceeded that of whites on a per capita basis
(though the majority of those executed were white).3 Moreover,
although the white execution rate declined over the course of the
seventeenth century, the black execution rate did not experience
4
a similar consistently downward trend.
During the eighteenth century, the colonial population grew
more than tenfold, including a large influx of African slaves
mostly to the South.5 Whereas in the seventeenth century the
majority of executions occurred in New England and the majority of those executed were white,6 in the eighteenth century the
majority of executions occurred in the South and the majority of
those executed were black2 This substantial shift in the use of
the death penalty seems clearly linked to the expansion of the
South's slave-labor economy and the demand by slave owners for
state assistance in disciplining the growing enslaved population,
a demand motivated by both economic-productivity concerns and
the perceived need to protect the increasingly outnumbered
white populations
Not only did the number of blacks executed surpass the
number of whites executed during the eighteenth century (a
trend that continued until the Civil War), but blacks were often
executed for different crimes.9 Whereas the vast majority of
whites sentenced to death were executed for murder, substantial
numbers of blacks were executed for nonhomicidal crimes.10
From the late eighteenth century to the Civil War, the rate of
execution for nonlethal crimes varied considerably by race, with
3 Howard W. Allen and Jerome M. Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty: Capital Punishment in American History 29-31 (SUNY 2008).
4
5

6
7

Id at 31.
Id at 31-32.

Id at 29.
Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 33 (cited in note 3).
8 See Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History 142 (Harvard 2003)
("From the perspective of slaveowners, harsh punishments were necessary to manage
such large captive populations.").
9 Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 33-34 (cited in note 3).
10 See id at 60-64.
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many more blacks being "executed for non-lethal and unknown"
offenses than whites across all regions of the country." In the
South, where the majority of executions of blacks occurred, the
nonlethal crimes that most frequently led to executions were
slave revolt, rape, attempted rape, and attempted murder.12
Moreover, blacks were much more likely than whites to be
subject to the most extreme modes of execution. Although the
majority of executions of both whites and blacks were by hanging until the twentieth century, much more terrifying and torturous methods were occasionally employed during the colonial
era and into the early nineteenth century. 13 In the British colonies, burning at the stake was a common torturous punishment,
whereas in Louisiana (a colony ruled by France, then Spain),
breaking on the wheel was more common. 4 In addition,
gibbeting (hanging in a cage or in chains) was sometimes employed as a method for displaying the body of the executed convict after death.15 Sometimes the bodies of executed convicts
were decapitated or otherwise dismembered and the heads or
body parts publicly displayed. 16 These more terrifying and torturous execution practices were uncommon, but when they were
employed, it was disproportionately in the execution of blacks,
especially slaves convicted of revolt or serious crimes against
whites. 17 Slave revolt was considered a form of "petit treason" on
the basis of an analogy between the household and the state;
such crimes were thus subject to a form of "super-capital punishment" in light of the perceived enormity and treachery of the
underlying offense.18
At the time of the Founding, capital punishment was an entrenched legal and social practice, explicitly acknowledged

11 Id at 60-62. See also Michael A. Powell, The Death Penalty in the South, in
Gordon Morris Bakken, ed, Invitation to an Execution: A History of the Death Penalty in
the United States 203, 204-05 (New Mexico 2010) (noting that the overwhelming majority of executions of whites in both the North and the South in the period stretching from
the early Republic to the Civil War were for the crime of murder).
12
See Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 63-64, 74 (cited in
note 3).
13 Seeid at 42.
14 Id at 36, 45.
15 Banner, The Death Penalty at 72-74 (cited in note 8).
16 Id at 74-75.
17 Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 45 (cited in note 3).
18 Banner, The Death Penalty at 71 (cited in note 8).
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several times in the Constitution. 19 Despite this apparent acceptance of the practice of capital punishment, many of the
Founders and important thinkers of the time had begun to question it in light of the influential critique by Italian jurist Cesare
Beccaria.20 Initiatives to restrict the death penalty escalated in
the new Republic, in contrast to Mother England, where expansive capital statutes continued to flourish at the turn of the
nineteenth century. 21 This rethinking and restriction of the
death penalty, however, was regionally variable within the
United States. While the North progressively narrowed the ambit of capital punishment, and the Midwest inaugurated the
mid-nineteenth-century movement toward full-scale abolition,
the South restricted the death penalty only for whites, simultaneously expanding its ambit in an explicitly racial fashion.22
In the North, the use of capital punishment for nonlethal offenses fell sharply from the end of the eighteenth to the middle
of the nineteenth century, such that by 1860, no Northern state
authorized execution for any offense other than murder or treason. 23 Indeed, the North began to restrict the use of capital punishment even for the crime of murder. In 1794, Pennsylvania
promulgated legislation dividing murder into degrees and restricting the death penalty to murders in the first degree.24 This
innovation eventually spread widely, but the only Southern
states to quickly adopt it did so with the explicit provision that
the new limitation did not apply to slaves.25

19 The Fifth Amendment presumes the availability of the death penalty in three
separate clauses-the guarantee of a grand jury in "capital" cases, the protection against
being placed twice in jeopardy "of life or limb," and the guarantee of due process of law
prior to deprivation of "life." US Const Amend V.
20 See Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A
New ConsiderationTransforms an Old Debate, 2010 U Chi Legal F 117, 126-27.
21 See Douglas Hay, Property,Authority, and the Criminal Law, in Douglas Hay, et
al, eds, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England 17, 18
(Pantheon 1975).
22 See Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 63 (cited in note 3)
("The number of capital offenses was reduced for whites, but if anything the number was
increased where African Americans were concerned."); Powell, The Death Penalty in the
South at 204 (cited in note 11) ("Although the offenses for which capital punishment applied to whites diminished in the South, the same was not true for blacks; the list of
crimes for which they could be punished by death became more extensive rather than
less.").
23 Banner, The Death Penalty at 131 (cited in note 8).
24 Id at 98.
25 See id at 99.
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This exception reflected the widespread practice throughout
the South prior to the Civil War of maintaining separate capital
offenses on the basis of slave status and on the basis of race, regardless of slave status. For example, in antebellum Virginia,
"free African Americans (but not whites) could get the death
penalty for rape, attempted rape, kidnapping a woman, and aggravated assault-all provided the victim was white; slaves in
Virginia were eligible for death for commission of a mindboggling sixty-six crimes."26 At the same time, whites in Virginia
could face the death penalty for just four crimes.27 While
Virginia had the most lopsided ratio of black-to-white capital
crimes, the other Southern states also promulgated racially
skewed capital codes. For example:
[S]laves in Texas (but not whites) were subject to capital
punishment for insurrection, arson, and-if the victim were
white-attempted murder, rape, attempted rape, robbery,
attempted robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. Free
blacks were subject to capital punishment for all these
28
offenses plus that of kidnapping a white woman.
The explicitly race- and slave-based capital codes prevalent
in the South, as well as the especially torturous modes of execution used for slave revolts and other serious crimes by blacks,
not only reflected prevailing racist attitudes and institutions but
also helped produce those attitudes by using the fearsome spectacle of public executions to imbue race and slave status with
the utmost significance. From early colonial times through the
Civil War, racial attitudes were hardened and entrenched "by
mobilizing race-encoding categories of punishment: Who is
whipped, who is hanged, and who is burned at the stake?"29 As a
result, in effect if not in explicit intent, "one of the functions of
the death penalty ... was to create race: to segregate the myriad

26

Sheri Lynn Johnson, Coker v. Georgia: Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past, in

John H. Blume and Jordan M. Steiker, eds, Death Penalty Stories 171, 191 (Foundation
2009).
27 George M. Stroud, A Sketch of the Laws Relating to Slavery in the Several States
of the United States of America 75 (Longstreth 2d ed 1856).
28 Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in HistoricalPerspective, in Charles J. Ogletree Jr and Austin Sarat, eds, From Lynch Mobs to the Killing
State: Race and the Death Penalty in America 96, 99 (NYU 2006).
29 Stephen John Hartnett, 1 Executing Democracy: Capital Punishment & the Making of America, 1683-1807 20 (Michigan State 2010).
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social positions of the New World into hard and fast categories of
white and black, free and enslaved."30
While the South was robustly enforcing its many capital
statutes against slaves and free blacks in the first half of the
nineteenth century, a movement to abolish capital punishment
was gathering momentum in the North and Midwest. Five
Northeastern states enacted so-called Maine laws, which were
named after a Maine statute passed in 1837 that required a oneyear waiting period between conviction and execution and that
resulted in a de facto moratorium on executions. 31 In 1846,
Michigan became the first state to abolish the death penalty for
murder, followed by Rhode Island in 1852 and Wisconsin in
1853.32 The abolition movement lost steam in the 1850s, as the
issue of slavery and the impending Civil War took precedence
over other issues.33 Despite several decades of death-penaltyabolition discussion, debate, and legal reform in the North and
Midwest, abolition was simply a nonstarter in the South. In
large part, abolition was inconceivable because of the widely
held belief that capital punishment was needed to maintain the
South's slave economy and society.34 But the death-penaltyabolition movement's failure even to develop a toehold in the
South doubtless also reflected the close connection in both people and ideology between the death-penalty-abolition movement
and the slavery-abolition movement. 35
An ironic result of the split between the North and the
South on capital punishment is that the United States now
holds the odd position of being in both the vanguard and the
rearguard of worldwide death-penalty abolition. The state of
Michigan has the much-vaunted distinction of being "the first
government in the English-speaking world to abolish capital
punishment for murder and lesser crimes."36 It has unwaveringly maintained its 1846 abolitionist stance to the present day. At
the same time, the United States as a nation is currently the

30

Id.

31 Banner, The Death Penalty at 134 (cited in note 8).
32 Id.
33

Id.

See id at 142.
See Banner, The Death Penalty at 142-43 (cited in note 8). See also Philip
English Mackey, ed, Voices against Death: American Opposition to Capital Punishment,
1 787-1975 xxviii (Burt Franklin 1976).
36 Eugene G. Wanger, Michigan & Capital Punishment, 81 Mich Bar J 38, 38
(2002).
34
35
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only Western democracy that still maintains the death penalty;
indeed, the United States has one of the top five execution rates
in the world today, along with China, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia. 37 This schizophrenic posture is a direct result of regional
division on the issue within the United States, which was born
of differing attitudes regarding the race-based practice of chattel
slavery.
With the South's defeat in the Civil War and the subsequent
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly race-based
capital codes could no longer be maintained. But race continued
to influence the application of facially neutral capital statutes
through prosecutorial discretion, all-white sentencing juries, and
the practice of extrajudicial executions by lynch mobS. 38 In the
aftermath of the Civil War, the death penalty offered "an alternative form[] of racial subjugation," necessary in the eyes of
some white Southerners "to restrain a primitive, animalistic
black population." 39 White Southerners feared violent revenge
and property crimes by the impoverished freed population,40 but
above all, they seemed to fear sexual aggression by black men
against white women. 41 These attitudes not only supported the
use of capital punishment but also prompted rampant private
violence against the newly freed black population, resulting in
what one historian called a "reign of terror" and an "orgy of racial violence" in the postbellum South.42 The practice of lynching,
which reached its peak in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, constituted "a form of unofficial capital punishment" that, in its heyday, was even more common than the official kind.43 Whether one considers only legal executions or
includes extralegal lynchings, a substantial majority of executions in the second half of the nineteenth century took place in

37 Laura Smith-Spark, China, U.S. in Top 5 for Executions Worldwide, (CNN, Apr
10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9MDK-FZBP.
38 See Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 81 (cited at note 3).
39 Banner, The Death Penalty at 228 (cited in note 8).
40 See Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 68 (cited in note 3).
41 See William D. Carrigan, The Making of a Lynching Culture: Violence and Vigilantism in Central Texas, 1836-1916 153 (Illinois 2004) ("Especially in the South, the
late nineteenth century was beset with white paranoia on the topic [of the rape of white
women by black men].").
42 Id at 112-13. See also Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 45 (Pantheon
1997) (describing the charge of rape by a black man of a white woman as "the most emotionally potent excuse" for lynchings).
43 Banner, The Death Penalty at 229 (cited in note 8).

2015] The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race

251

the South, and the vast majority (more than 75 percent) of
44
Southern executions were of blacks.
Even during the country's most active period of deathpenalty abolition-the Progressive Era at the turn of the twentieth century, when ten states abolished the death penalty for
murder-race played a highly salient role. 45 Although none of
the abolishing states were in the Deep South, their abolitions
proved tenuous, with eight of the ten states ultimately reinstating the death penalty, often within only a few years of
abolition.46 During the abolition and reinstatement debates, two
arguments with potent racial overtones were powerfully
present-the need to retain capital punishment both to prevent
lynchings and to promote a program of eugenics. 47 The surprising prominence and salience of these death-penalty arguments
in the early twentieth century "reveal how much the debates
about capital punishment at that time were debates about race
and how much the death penalty itself, as it was practiced on
4s
the ground, was racially inflected.
Although the first half of the twentieth century saw a substantial decline in lynch-mob violence, the death penalty continued to serve as a means of racial subjugation, especially in the
South. The breadth of Southern capital statutes persisted into
the twentieth century: "[Miost of the southern states' capital
crimes on the eve of the Civil War were still capital nearly a century later."49 Moreover, the need to forestall lynch-mob violence
led Southern reformers to urge expediting the criminal process
to allow for immediate trials followed by instant executionspressures that created the practice known derogatorily as "legal
lynching."50 The South's distinctive racial history thus left its
mark not only on the substance of capital statutes, but also on
procedure in capital trials (and criminal justice more generally).
Indeed, the Supreme Court's criminal procedure revolution of
the 1960s, in which the Court recognized and expanded many
44 See Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 70, 76, 97, 101, 105,
121, 133 (cited in note 3).
45 See Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of
DiscontinuousDebate, 100 J Crim L & Crimin 643, 646-61 (2010).
46 Id at 649.
47 See id at 646.
48 Id at 661.
49 Banner, The Death Penalty at 228 (cited in note 8).
50 See Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts
"Legal Lynchings", in Carol S. Steiker, ed, Criminal Procedure Stories 1, 2-3, 5, 11
(Foundation 2006).
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constitutional protections for criminal defendants, itself had an
unstated racial subtext in light of the substantial "intersection
of the criminal procedure revolution and the struggle for racial
equality, especially in the South."51
The lack of adequate legal process in capital trials in the
South, especially in cases involving black men accused of raping
white women, brought the NAACP and other civil rights organizations repeatedly to the South to defend the accused, who often
faced dubious charges on the flimsiest of evidence.52 The participation of Thurgood Marshall in one such effort in Groveland,
Florida, is the subject of Gilbert King's Pulitzer Prize-winning
book, Devil in the Grove, in which King suggests that the case
"became the impetus behind the NAACP's capital punishment
program, which eventually led to the Supreme Court ruling [in
Furman
v
Georgia53] that
capital punishment
was
unconstitutional.'54
The straight line that King draws from Groveland to
Furman is supported by the staggering statistics regarding the
racial use of rape prosecutions in the South long after lynching's
heyday. The overwhelming majority of convicted rapists executed in the South in the twentieth century were black5. Racial
disparities for murder, though less striking, were evident in the
South as well.56 Although racial disparities in execution rates
were less obviously stunning outside the South, blacks were still
executed in disproportion to their numbers everywhere in the
United States5 7 Indeed, over the broad sweep of American history from 1608 to 1945, blacks, along with other minority groups,
constituted a majority of those executed.58 Blacks alone constituted almost half of those executed in that long timeframe-and

51 Carol S. Steiker, Introduction,in Steiker, ed, Criminal ProcedureStories vii, viii
(cited in note 50).
52 For examples of these cases of alleged rape, see generally Irvin v State, 66 S2d
288 (Fla 1953); Irvin v Chapman, 75 S2d 591 (Fla 1954); Sims v Balkcom, 136 SE2d 766
(Ga 1964). For an example of the NAACP's involvement in civil actions, see generally
Earle v Greenville County, 56 SE2d 348 (SC 1949) (seeking damages for a lynching).
53 408 US 238 (1972).
54 Gilbert King, Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and
the Dawn of a New America 5 (HarperCollins 2012).
55 See Barrett J. Foerster, Race, Rape, and Injustice: Documenting and Challenging
Death Penalty Cases in the Civil Rights Era 9-10 (Tennessee 2012); Banner, Traces of
Slavery at 107 (cited in note 28).
56 Banner, Traces of Slavery at 107 (cited in note 28).
57 Allen and Clubb, Race, Class, and the Death Penalty at 168 (cited in note 3).
58 Id at 148.
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they would constitute a much larger proportion if lynch-mob executions were included in the count.5 9
The dry statistics on the use of capital punishment were a
lived reality for the civil rights activists of the mid-twentieth
century, especially for Thurgood Marshall, who risked his life in
Groveland and throughout his work on other capital trials in the
South. The extent to which the history of the American death
penalty was "soaked in racism" was not news to the NAACP.6o
Just as the nineteenth-century movement for legislative deathpenalty abolition was tied to the slavery-abolition movement in
personnel and ideology, the twentieth-century movement for judicial death-penalty abolition was tied to the civil rights movement. Unsurprisingly, the impetus and focus of the ensuing litigation strategy were race based in ways that could not possibly
have been overlooked or misunderstood by the courts.
II. INVISIBILITY

The salience of race in American capital punishment law
and practice prior to the 1960s contrasts sharply with its relative invisibility in the judicial opinions issued in the foundational cases of the modern era. Concerns about racial discrimination
clearly motivated judicial interest in subjecting the death
penalty to constitutional regulation. The LDF, the preeminent
civil rights organization devoted to eradicating racial discrimination, was the public face of the legal assault on capital punishment. The legal claims that it advanced in the Supreme
Court, as well as the evidence offered in support of those claims,
focused on the persistence of racial discrimination. The emphasis on racial discrimination in the briefs was evident not only in
the briefs filed by the LDF but also in those prepared by a variety of amici. And yet a cursory-indeed, even a careful-reading
of the Court's opinions in the defining era (from roughly 1963 to
the late 1970s) reveals little attention to racial discrimination.
This Part will document the odd dialogue between death-penalty
litigants and the Court during this era, in which litigants repeatedly urged the Court to limit or abolish the death penalty
because of its racially discriminatory administration and the
Court consistently declined to use race as the lens for understanding or regulating the American death penalty.

59
60

Id at 148-49.
Banner, Traces of Slavery at 97 (cited in note 28).
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Before the 1960s, defense lawyers challenged various aspects of capital convictions but rarely challenged the constitutionality of the death penalty itself. The Supreme Court heard
some challenges to execution methods,61 including a challenge to
Louisiana's effort to try again after the infamous botched electrocution of Willie Francis in 1946.62 The Scottsboro Boys case
yielded a decision establishing the right to counsel in capital
cases, 63 making it the first case to suggest that capital trials demand greater procedural protections than noncapital trials. But
for the most part, lawyers representing death-sentenced inmates
raised generic claims available to all criminal defendants, challenging discrimination in jury selection, coercive interrogation
techniques, improper venue, and so forth. The constitutionality
of capital punishment qua punishment went unquestioned in
part because of its long-standing pedigree (it was a continuous
practice in most states from the colonial and Founding eras
through the 1950s) and in part because of the textual acknowledgements of the practice in the Constitution itself.64
But the same concerns about racial injustice that had produced Brown v Board of Education of Topeka65 and the broader
criminal procedure revolution led the Supreme Court to invite
constitutional scrutiny of the death penalty. "Invite" is the appropriate word because Justice Arthur Goldberg decided to scrutinize the death penalty as an available punishment before any
litigants had advanced that argument. In the summer of 1963,
he directed his law clerk, Alan Dershowitz, to analyze whether
the death penalty remained consistent with constitutional
standards.66 Dershowitz was skeptical about the plausibility of
rejecting the death penalty as unconstitutional, and his resulting memorandum instead emphasized two related aspects of its
administration: its use in nonhomicidal cases such as rape, and
its racially discriminatory application.67 Goldberg was unable to
61 See, for example, Wilkerson v Utah, 99 US 130, 132-33 (1878) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to execution via firing squad); In re Kemmler, 136 US 436, 441, 447
(1890) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to death by electrocution).
62 See Louisiana v Resweber, 329 US 459, 460-61 (1947).
63 See Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 71 (1932).
64 See note 19 and accompanying text.
65 347 US 483 (1954).
66 For a discussion of the origins and development of Goldberg's memo on capital
punishment and his subsequent dissent from the denial of certiorari in Rudolph v
Alabama, 375 US 889 (1963), see Evan J. Mandery, A Wild Justice: The Death and Resurrectionof Capital Punishment in America 3-30 (Norton 2013).
67 See Mandery, A Wild Justice at 21-22 (cited in note 66).
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convince his colleagues to grant review in the death-penalty cases that came to the Court, so he chose to publish his "dissent
from the denial" of certiorari, joined by Justices William Brennan and William Douglas, in two cases involving black inmates
sentenced to death for the rape of white victims.68 At Chief Justice Earl Warren's urging, Goldberg omitted any reference to
race in his published opinion,69 instead announcing his view that
several questions surrounding the availability of the death penalty for rape were "relevant and worthy of argument and consideration," including whether such a practice violates "evolving
standards of decency," whether taking life to protect a value
other than life constitutes excessive punishment, and whether
the permissible aims of punishment could be achieved in such
70
cases with punishments less than death.
Despite the absence of any overt arguments about race,
Rudolph v Alabama7l immediately caught the attention of the
LDF. In the preceding decades, the LDF had taken an interest
in a limited number of capital cases, focusing primarily on cases
involving black defendants who had a plausible claim of actual
innocence, as well as cases involving some systemic issues like
racial discrimination in grand jury selection. 72 Now, though,
three members of the Court had revealed their discomfort with
the one aspect of the American death penalty-its availability
for rape-that was undeniably linked to racial prejudice. LDF
lawyers responded by pursuing an ambitious empirical study of
rape cases in the South in order to document its racially discriminatory dimensions. They engaged Professor Marvin Wolfgang, a
leading criminologist at the University of Pennsylvania, to design the study, and they sent a cohort of law students to courthouses throughout the Deep South during the summer of 1965
73
to gather the raw data needed to show disparate treatment.
The nature of the project and the manner of its
Id at 27-28.
Id at 28-29. Warren permitted Goldberg to retain a footnote to the United Nations Report on Capital Punishment, which itself included data on the death penalty's
racially discriminatory use; both "Dershowitz and Goldberg hoped that this oblique reference would be enough" to reflect discomfort about the death penalty's racist administration. Id at 29.
70 Rudolph, 375 US at 889-91.
71
375 US 889 (1963).
72
See Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshalland the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 56-57 (Oxford 1994).
73 Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and CapitalPunishment 78, 86-88 (Random House 1973).
68

69
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execution-young liberals traveling to the Deep South in order
to uncover racial discrimination-made clear that the LDF's
work on the death penalty was of a piece with its other civil
rights work of the same era.
The resulting litigation in Maxwell v Bishop74 challenged
discriminatory patterns in Arkansas capital-rape cases.
Wolfgang had concluded that black-on-white-rape cases in Arkansas were more likely to yield capital sentences than any other racial combinations, controlling for twenty-nine nonracial variables. 75 On federal habeas, the district court resisted the claim
76
of racial discrimination by faulting the study's methodology.
The Eighth Circuit (then-judge Harry Blackmun writing for the
panel) affirmed, holding that Maxwell had failed to establish
discrimination in his case and expressing skepticism about his
ever prevailing on the basis of statistical showings of statewide
77
discrimination.
By the time that Maxwell lost in the Eighth Circuit, the
LDF approach to capital cases had expanded dramatically. Instead of focusing solely on black defendants or largely on issues
of racial discrimination, the LDF embarked on a more encompassing effort to bring the American death penalty to a halt. The
LDF's "moratorium" strategy was to prevent any executionsregardless of the inmate's race-by raising all available procedural claims. 78 Some of those claims were garden-variety challenges to illegal searches, questionable confessions, and the like,
relying on the Warren Court's dramatic extension of criminal
procedural protections to state inmates. 79 But many of the
claims focused specifically on defects in capital litigation, including the ubiquitous practice of excluding potential jurors who had
any qualms about the death penalty; the use of "unitary" trials,
in which defendants had no separate opportunity to seek mercy
apart from the adjudication of guilt or innocence; and the failure
of state capital schemes to provide any guidance as to who
should receive the death penalty.80
74 398 F2d 138 (8th Cir 1968).
75 Mandery, A Wild Justice at 38-39 (cited in note 66).
76 See Maxwell, 398 F2d at 145.
77 Id at 148 ("We are not certain that, for Maxwell, statistics will ever be his
redemption.").
78 See Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual at 71, 106-07 (cited in note 73).
79 See David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty in an Age of
Abolition 222-23 (Belknap 2010).
80 Id at 67-70.
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The decision to attack the death penalty itself implicated
complicated judgments that were both pragmatic and principled.
LDF lawyers realized that the Court might not embrace its
claims of racial discrimination and understood that the best
hope for many death-sentenced black inmates might rest on
broader reforms-perhaps even abolition-of the capital system.
In addition, LDF lawyers were themselves opposed to the death
penalty even apart from its racially discriminatory administration, and when they realized that their strategies could benefit a
broader swath of inmates, they felt obligated to expand their
charge. Tony Amsterdam, the brilliant architect of the LDF effort, explained that "[w]e could no more let men die that we had
the power to save ... than we could have passed by a dying accident victim sprawled bloody and writhing on the road without
81
stopping to render such aid as we could."'
Importantly, many of the LDF's new capital-specific claims
drew on and reinforced concerns about racial discrimination.
Death qualification of jurorss2 was a common means of excluding
minorities from capital juries. 83 Standardless discretion in state
capital statutes allowed prosecutors and juries to reach different
results in similar cases and insulated racial disparities from judicial review.
When the LDF sought review of Maxwell's case before the
US Supreme Court, it focused primarily on the extensive evidence of racial discrimination in Arkansas rape cases and the
ways that standardless discretion facilitated that discrimination. The petition for certiorari declared that the "detailed and
exhaustive examination" of the cases "graphically demonstrates
the grim consequences of leaving unfettered and uninformed
discretion to juries to choose between death and lesser penalties
for rape in a state which has historically practiced racial discrimination." 4 The petition evocatively compared the sort of
81 Id at 108 (quotation marks omitted).
82 See Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy inside the Jury Room and
outside the Courtroom, 65 U Chi L Rev 433, 483 (1998) (defining "death qualification" as
"authorizing the disqualification of only those jurors who are unable to exercise the discretion required by law").
83 See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc, and the National Office for the Rights
of the Indigent, Witherspoon v Illinois, No 1015, *33-34 (US filed Mar 12, 1968) (available on Westlaw at 1968 WL 129362) ("Witherspoon LDF Brief').
84 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit, Maxwell v Bishop, No 622-13, *35-36 (US filed Oct 9, 1968) ('"Maxwell
Certiorari Petition").
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discrimination evident in the Arkansas system to the practice of
lynching in an earlier era: "Decisions of this Court have long
recognized that violence may emanate from the state as well as
from the mob, and that violence under color of law is as dangerous to the social fabric as that not cloaked with legitimate
authority."85
Ultimately, the Court granted certiorari on Maxwell's
claims regarding standardless discretion and Arkansas's unitary
structure but declined to review the claim of racial discrimination.86 Notwithstanding the Court's limited grant of certiorari,
both Maxwell's lawyers and amici continued to press the issue of
racial discrimination. An amicus brief filed on behalf of various
Jewish organizations argued extensively that the death penalty
for rape constituted a "badge of slavery," offering an elaborate
chart demonstrating the near-perfect overlap between states
that practiced racial segregation and those that authorized the
death penalty for rape. 87 An amicus brief filed on behalf of various civil rights advocates (including William Coleman, Burke
Marshall, and Cyrus Vance) argued that the Arkansas procedure for selecting jurors-which tied eligibility to payment of a
poll tax-likely contributed to the jurors' understanding of their
charge "as authorizing them to take race into account in decid-

ing [Maxwell's]

fate."88

While Maxwell was pending, the Court ruled in Witherspoon
v Illinois89 against Illinois's overbroad approach to deathqualifying jurors.90 In light of this development, Maxwell's LDF
lawyers filed a supplemental pleading with the Court. Maxwell's
lawyers realized that he was entitled to relief under Witherspoon
but urged the Court to nonetheless address the issues on which

Id at *42.
See Maxwell v Bishop, 393 US 997, 997-98 (1968) (granting certiorari).
Brief Amici Curiae of the Synagogue Council of America and Its Constituents
(The Central Conference of American Rabbis, the Rabbinical Assembly of America, the
Rabbinical Council of America, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Union
of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, the United Synagogue of America) and
the American Jewish Congress, Maxwell v Bishop, No 622-13, *26-30 (US filed Sept 15,
1969) (available on Westlaw at 1969 WL 136886).
88 Brief Amici Curiae of Berl I. Bernhard, William Coleman, Samuel Dash, John W.
Douglas, Steven Duke, William T. Gossett, John Griffiths, Rita Hauser, George N.
Lindsay, Burke Marshall, Monrad S. Paulsen, Steven R. Rivkin, Whitney North Seymour, Jerome J. Shestack, and Cyrus R. Vance, Urging Reversal, Maxwell v Bishop, No
622-13, *6 (US filed Oct 24, 1969) (available on Westlaw at 1989 WL 1184278).
89 391 US 510 (1968).
90 Id at 521-23.
85

86
87

2015]

The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race

259

certiorari had been granted.91 In their view, if the Court were to
grant Maxwell relief on narrow grounds and decline to address
the broader questions of standardless discretion and unitary
proceedings in other cases, those choices "could only be characterized as incredibly heedless of human life" given the number of
inmates potentially affected by the broader claims.92 Indeed,
Maxwell's lawyers used the opportunity presented by the supplemental brief to ask the Court to broaden the scope of its consideration and revisit its decision not to grant certiorari on the
93
underlying claim of racial discrimination.
The Court subsequently reversed Maxwell's sentence based
on Witherspoon in a brief opinion that did not mention race. 94 In
describing the procedural posture of the case, the Court indicated that Maxwell's federal habeas petition had claimed, "among
other things,"95 that the Constitution prohibited the standardless discretion and unitary procedure of the Arkansas capital
scheme, conspicuously omitting the empirical challenge to Arkansas's use of the death penalty to punish almost exclusively
interracial rapes involving black defendants and white victims.
The Court then concluded that the wholesale exclusion of jurors
with any conscientious reservations about the death penalty required reversal. 96 At the end of the opinion, the Court noted that
it had granted certiorari in two other cases presenting the
97
standardless-discretion and unitary-proceeding challenges.

91 See Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, Maxwell v Bishop, No 622-13, *5-6 (US
filed Sept 17, 1969) (available on Westlaw at 1969 WL 120077).
92
Idat*31.
93 See id at *1 n 1.
94 See generally Maxwell v Bishop, 398 US 262 (1970).
95 Id at 264.
96 See id at 265-66.
97 Id at 267 & n 4. Prior to the decision to reverse Maxwell's conviction on Witherspoon grounds, both Douglas and Brennan drafted opinions (neither of which were ever
published) addressing the claims regarding Arkansas's unitary proceeding and the jury's
standardless discretion in imposing death. See generally Maxwell v Bishop, No 622-13
(1970) (draft concurrence of Brennan), on file with the Library of Congress ("Brennan
Draft Concurrence"); Maxwell v Bishop, No 622-13 (1970) (draft opinion of Douglas), on
file with the Library of Congress ("Douglas Draft Opinion"). Douglas's opinion, denominated the "opinion of the Court," rejected the unitary proceeding because it discouraged
defendants from presenting important mitigating evidence relevant to the sentencing decision. Douglas Draft Opinion at 4-5. Douglas's draft would have found standardless discretion intolerable because of the unfairness of a procedure that afforded absolute discretion with respect to such an important interest. See id at 6. Both Douglas and Brennan
highlighted the possibility that such discretion could result in racially discriminatory decisionmaking, though neither ventured an opinion on the racial distribution of capital
verdicts in Arkansas rape cases. Id at 8; Brennan Draft Concurrence at 5. Interestingly,
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Rudolph and Maxwell were missed opportunities in the
sense that the Court flagged troublesome capital-rape cases involving black men sentenced to death for raping white victims in
the Deep South and ultimately chose not to comment on-much
less address or remedy-the widely appreciated fact of racial
discrimination inseparable from the practice. But the Court's silence about race extended to the other foundational cases in
which litigants highlighted the ubiquitous risk of racial discrimination. In Witherspoon itself, Witherspoon's lawyers argued
that the exclusion of scrupled jurors-those who harbored
doubts about the death penalty-would undermine a defendant's
right to a fair cross section of the community in capital cases,
explicitly noting the disproportionate exclusion of blacks in the
operation of Illinois's death-qualification process. 98 Likewise, the
LDF's amicus brief insisted that the death-qualification process
in many states allowed prosecutors to do indirectly what they
could not do directly-prevent blacks from sitting on capital juries. 9 Even though Witherspoon had been convicted of murder
rather than rape, the LDF highlighted in its statement of interest its particular concern about racial discrimination in the operation of capital punishment; the statement observed that
Wolfgang's recent empirical work confirmed the LDF's view
"that the death penalty is administered in the United States in a
fashion that makes racial minorities, the deprived and

both justices cited Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886), as the lead case against the
exercise of "naked and arbitrary power" over a significant interest, even though Yick Wo
involved discretion exercised by a licensing board outside of the criminal justice system.
Douglas Draft Opinion at 6; Brennan Draft Concurrence at 5-6. The
"real" reason to cite Yick Wo, though neither Douglas nor Brennan made the point explicitly, is that the result of the discretion exercised in Yick Wo-like the distribution of the
Arkansas death penalty in rape cases-was inexplicable except on racial grounds: virtually every person of Chinese descent seeking a laundry license was denied, whereas virtually all other applicants were approved. Yick Wo, 118 US at 373-74. In the constitutional canon, Yick Wo stands for the proposition that intentional racial discrimination
can be demonstrated even absent a facially discriminatory statute. See generally, for example, David E. Bernstein, Revisiting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 2008 U Ill L Rev 1393 (acknowledging the influence of racial considerations on the justices). In their respective
opinions, Douglas and Brennan seem to transform Yick Wo into a procedural decision
about unbridled discretion rather than a substantive showing of undisguised racism.
They both avoid commenting on the empirical evidence that race did play a role in
Arkansas cases, though they make explicit (indeed, in some respects, more explicit than
the Court in Furman)the connection between standardless discretion and the risk of racially discriminatory outcomes.
98 Petitioner's Brief, Witherspoon v Illinois, No 1015, *17-20 (US filed Mar 11,
1968) (available on Westlaw at 1968 WL 112521).
99 Witherspoon LDF Brief at *38-39 (cited in note 83).
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downtrodden, the peculiar objects of capital charges, capital
convictions, and sentences of death."100 The LDF also noted in
the body of its brief that the risk of death qualification disproportionately excluding blacks was particularly high "when persons opposed only to the death penalty for rape are excluded as
scrupled."101 The ACLU also emphasized in its amicus brief the
discriminatory application of the death penalty, which itself
might cause blacks to harbor greater doubts about the punishment than other groups (citing evidence that 78 percent of
blacks opposed the death penalty).102 The various briefs together
suggested the possibility of a troubling dynamic, in which blacks
experienced the death penalty as racially discriminatory, thereby enabling their disproportionate exclusion from capital juries
based on their "scruples," which in turn would contribute to
discriminatory results.
Despite the numerous references to race in the pleadings,
the justices' resulting opinions made no mention of race. Justice
Potter Stewart's majority opinion in Witherspoon emphasized
that the issue before the Court was a "narrow one," declining to
address whether death qualification undermined a defendant's
right to a fair trial at the guilt stage and affirming that states
retained the power to exclude prospective jurors who clearly indicated their refusal to vote for death.103 Though the Court cited
a recent Gallup Poll indicating relatively low support for the
death penalty nationwide,104 it declined to report the much larger number of blacks who opposed the death penalty and the corresponding disproportionate exclusion of black jurors that
Illinois's death-qualification practices entailed; it likewise failed
to confront the continuing disproportionate exclusion of blacks
that would result from permissible death-qualification measures
untouched by the decision.
The standardless-discretion question avoided in Maxwell resurfaced first in McGautha v Californiao5 as a due process

100 Id at *3-M.
101 Id at *28.
102 Brief of the Illinois Division, American Civil Liberties Union, as Amicus Curiae,
Witherspoon v Illinois, No 1015, *17 (US filed Mar 1, 1968) (available on Westlaw at
1968 WL 112520).
103 Witherspoon, 391 US at 513-14.
104 Id at 520 n 16 (citing a 1966 Gallup Poll in which only 42 percent of Americans
expressed that they favored capital punishment for convicted murderers).
105 402 US 183 (1971).
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claimo6 and then again in Furman under the Eighth Amendment. 0 7 The McGautha briefing makes less of race than did the
similar briefing in Maxwell, perhaps in part because the litigation strategy in Maxwell emphasized the connection between
standardless discretion and the discriminatory results contained
in the Wolfgang study.108 By the time of McGautha, the stock
language framing the standardless-discretion claim denounced
the "arbitrariness," "discrimination," and "irrationality" wrought
by the absence of standards, and virtually all the briefs use
these terms frequently and interchangeably.O9 Both the brief for
McGautha and some of the amicus briefs in his case explicitly
claimed that standardless discretion produced racially discriminatory outcomes, 110 though the briefs as a whole did not make
this their primary point. In response, California offered empirical data supporting its claim that "all indications are that a defendant's race plays no part" in capital-jury decisionmaking in
California, with the raw data showing that black offenders constituted a smaller percentage of death-sentenced inmates (23
percent) than non-death-sentenced inmates (39 percent) convicted of first-degree murder."'
When the Court rejected the standardless-discretion claim
in McGautha (as well as the companion claim regarding unitary
trials), many observers thought that global challenges to capital
punishment were essentially exhausted.112 But the Court immediately granted certiorari in four new cases-collected in
Furman-that asked whether the death penalty could be imposed in those cases consistent with the Eighth Amendment's
Id at 196.
Furman,408 US at 239.
108 See text accompanying notes 82-88.
109 See, for example, Brief for Petitioner, McGautha v California, No 203, *18 (US
filed Aug 4, 1970) (available on Westlaw at 1970 WL 122021) ("McGautha Petitioner's
Brief'); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae,
McGautha v California,No 203, *7, 13 (US filed Nov 3, 1970) (available on Westlaw at
1970 WL 122024) ("McGautha Amicus Motion"). See also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, McGautha v California,No 203, *82, 109 (US filed Oct 15, 1970) (available on Westlaw at 1970 WL 122193).
110 See McGautha Petitioner's Brief at *20 (cited in note 109). See also, for example,
McGautha Amicus Motion at *30-31 (cited in note 109).
"'l Respondent's Brief, McGautha v California,No 203, *74 (US filed Sept 25, 1970)
(available on Westlaw at 1970 WL 122022).
112 See, for example, Mandery, A Wild Justice at 111-12, 114 (cited in note 66) (describing the LDF's disappointment with the McGautha decision); Banner, The Death
Penalty at 257 (cited in note 8) (noting that, after McGautha, "[tihe movement to use the
courts to abolish capital punishment seemed to have come to an end").
106

107
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prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 113 Like McGautha,
the defendants in all four cases were black.,14 But the Furman
briefing emphasized to a greater extent the ways in which racial
discrimination permeated state capital systems. The inventive
LDF strategy did not directly encourage the Court to invalidate
the death penalty because of racial discrimination. Rather, the
litigants argued that the fact of racial discrimination accounted
for capital statutes staying on the books despite dwindling popular support. 115 That is, the standardless discretion in state
schemes permitted the application of capital punishment solely
against despised, marginal groups-particularly blacks-and
the broader public's concerns about the death penalty were likely muted by the knowledge of its limited reach. In Aikens v California,116 which was later mooted by the invalidation of a statute
under state law, the petitioner's brief captured this argument
poignantly: "A legislator may not scruple to put a law on the
books (still less, to maintain an old law on the books) whose general, even-handed, non-arbitrary application the public would
abhor-precisely because both he and the public know that it
'
will not be enforced generally, even-handedly, non-arbitrarily." 117
More directly, Aikens's brief stated that "[t]hose who are selected to die are the poor and powerless, personally ugly and socially
unacceptable... [and disproportionately] black." 11
Furman's own brief also intimated that the absence of
standards could produce discriminatory outcomes. Furman argued that the jury that had sentenced him to die (for a minimally aggravated crime 1 9) knew very little about him or his circumstances-apart from the facts of his crime, his age, and his
race. 120 Georgia responded that it could "hardly be presumed
that the juries in this country have conspired to sentence only
certain classes of persons within our society, or that the juries
113

Furman,408 US at 239.

114 Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals,82 Wash L Rev 1, 16, 31 (2007).

115 Brief for Petitioner, Aikens v California, No 68-5027, *39-43, 50-53 (US filed
Sept 10, 1971) (available on Westlaw at 1971 WL 134168) ("Aikens Petitioner's Brief').
116 406 US 813 (1972).
117 Aikens Petitioner's Brief at *22 (cited in note 115).
118 Id at *51.
119 See Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia: Not an End, but a Beginning, in Blume
and Steiker, eds, Death Penalty Stories 95, 95-96 (cited in note 26) (describing Furman
as a "thwarted burglar who shot-quite possibly accidentally-toward a closed door
while fleeing").
120 See Brief for Petitioner, Furman v Georgia, No 69-5003, *8, 12 (US filed Sept 9,
1971) (available on Westlaw at 1971 WL 134167).
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responsible for the death penalties now outstanding were infected with an impermissible discrimination."121 Georgia, like California in McGautha, maintained that the evidence did not support an inference of "rampant" discrimination and that the high
concentration of blacks on death row in Georgia was likely attributable to the high offending rates of blacks.122
The amicus briefs in Furman extensively documented the
role of race in American capital punishment. A coalition of
Jewish organizations again drew the Court's attention to the
connection between segregation and retention of the death penalty.123 A brief filed on behalf of several civil rights organizations
(including the NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference) broadly outlined race's shadow over the American
death penalty. The brief declared that "[t]he total history of the
administration of capital punishment in America, both through
formal authority, and informally, is persuasive evidence, that
racial discrimination was, and still is, an impermissible factor in
the disproportionate imposition of the death penalty upon nonwhite American citizens."'124 The brief recounted racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty during slavery
and the experience of lynching and vigilantism stretching from
the post-Reconstruction era through the mid-1930s, explicitly
arguing that "the disproportionate numbers of non-white persons executed by formal capital punishment" violated the Eighth
Amendment.125 Another amicus brief, filed on behalf of various
churches, argued that the death penalty denies condemned persons their religious freedom by depriving them of the
121 Brief for Respondent, Furman v Georgia, No 69-5003, *79 (US filed Sept 24,
1971) (available on Westlaw at 1971 WL 126674) ("Furman Respondent's Brief").
122 Id at *80 (citing 1970 Atlanta Police Department statistics indicating that 187
murders were committed by black offenders compared to 55 murders committed by white
offenders).
123 See Brief Amici Curiae and Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae of the
Synagogue Council of America and Its Constituents (The Central Conference of American Rabbis, the Rabbinical Assembly of America, the Rabbinical Council of America, the
Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
of America, the United Synagogue of America) and the American Jewish Congress, Furman v Georgia, No 69-6003, *29-34 (US filed Sept 9, 1971) (available on Westlaw at
1971 WL 134169).
124 Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Urban League,
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the National Council of Negro Women, Furman v Georgia, No
69-5003, *7 (US filed Aug 31, 1971) (available on Westlaw at 1971 WL 134376).
125 Id at *8-13 (capitalization altered).
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opportunity to seek salvation.126 It further argued that the disproportionate application of the death penalty to men who are
from "less-favored ethnic and socio-economic groups" compounds
the violation by adding to the mental suffering of offenders who
are aware of the invidious discrimination directed at their
groups.

127

Five justices in Furman agreed that the prevailing administration of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment,
though each wrote separately to explain the grounds for his
support of the one-paragraph, per curiam opinion. Notwithstanding the briefs' sustained and evocative references to the
role of racial discrimination in the American death penalty, the
various opinions supporting the judgment are relatively sparse
in their references to the problem of race, especially in light of
their extraordinary collective length (about 135 pages in the US
Reports).128 Justices Brennan and Byron White made no arguments whatsoever about racial discrimination. Douglas alone
offered a sustained critique of the discriminatory administration
of the death penalty, quoting a presidential study that had observed that "[t]he death sentence is disproportionately imposed
and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups.129 Douglas discussed the race and crimes of the
offenders before the Court; the offenders were two black men
convicted of raping white women and one black man convicted of
murder in the commission of a burglary.130 He then added that
he could not conclude, based on the records before the Court,
"that these defendants were sentenced to death because they
were black.131 Instead, he criticized the unbridled discretion afforded judges and juries in such cases, concluding that the "discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation" because they are "pregnant with discrimination."' 132 Stewart
likewise indicated that "racial discrimination ha[d] not been
proved133 but concluded that the administration of the death

126 See Brief Amici Curiae of the West Virginia Council of Churches, Christian
Church (Disciples) in West Virginia, and United Methodist Church, West Virginia Conference, Furman v Georgia, No 69-5003, *4 (US filed Aug 26, 1971).
127 Id at *11.
128 See Furman, 408 US at 240-374.
129 Id at 249-50 (Douglas concurring) (quotation marks omitted).
130 Id at 252 (Douglas concurring).
131 Id at 253 (Douglas concurring).
132 Furman, 408 US at 256-57 (Douglas concurring).
133 Id at 310 (Stewart concurring).
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penalty was unconstitutional because it had been "wantonly and
[ freakishly inflicted."134
Justice Marshall offered an extensive history of capital punishment in the United States, moving from the early and late colonial periods to the Founding era and then through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 135 None of this history references
race or racial discrimination. Marshall then focused on whether
capital punishment was necessary to achieve various possible
goals of punishment, such as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, encouragement of pleas, eugenics, and efficiency.136 Finally,
Marshall asked whether the death penalty remained consistent
with prevailing morality, focusing not on polling data (which he
argued was of limited value) but instead on whether American
citizens would support the death penalty if they were aware "of
all information presently available."'137 The "facts" developed by
Marshall included the absence of any proven deterrent effect beyond that obtained through life imprisonment, the rarity of
death sentences relative to convictions for murder, the low recidivism rate for convicted murderers released from prison, and
their generally good behavior while incarcerated.138 In
Marshall's view, these facts alone would be sufficient to persuade "the great mass of citizens ...that the death penalty is
immoral and therefore unconstitutional."139 He then added three
"supplement[al]" facts that would likely "convince even the most
hesitant of citizens to condemn death as a sanction"-its discriminatory administration, its application against innocent
persons, and its dislocating effects on the rest of the criminaljustice system.140 On the discrimination point, Marshall cited
studies providing evidence of racial discrimination, as well as
evidence of discrimination on the basis of sex, class, intelligence,
and privilege.141 His entire treatment of discrimination occupies
three paragraphs in his sixty-page concurrence, and only one of
Id (Stewart concurring) (quotation marks omitted).
135 Id at 316-22 (Marshall concurring).
136 Furman, 408 US at 342-59 (Marshall concurring).
137 Id at 362 (Marshall concurring).
138 Id at 362-63 (Marshall concurring).
139 Id at 363 (Marshall concurring).
140 Furman, 408 US at 363-64 (Marshall concurring).
141 Id at 364-66 (Marshall concurring), citing, among others, US Department of Justice Bureau of Prisons, National PrisonerStatistics Bulletin No 45, in Capital Punishment 1930-1968 7, 28 (1969); Martin E. Wolfgang, A Sociological Analysis of Criminal
Homicide, in Hugo Adam Bedau, ed, 1 The Death Penalty in America 405, 411-14
(Oxford rev ed 1967).
134
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those paragraphs focuses on race.142 Notably absent in his
lengthy history of the American death penalty, and in his discussion of the "purposes" of capital punishment, is any indication that the death penalty was used to oppress minorities; like
Douglas, Marshall appeared as troubled by the seeming
underenforcement of the death penalty against the privileged as
he was by the application of capital punishment against minori43
ties and the poor.
As a whole, the five concurrences convey the impression
that the majority justices were extremely reluctant to assert
that the defendants before them (even the two defendants condemned for rape) might have been victims of racial
discrimination. Despite ample ammunition in the amicus
briefs-particularly the civil rights organizations' brief-none of
the justices seemed willing to offer a detailed history of the role
of race in shaping capital statutes and practices for over two
hundred years. Douglas and Marshall-the only two justices
who addressed race at all-seemed content to suggest that relatively recent outcomes were discriminatory (that is, dating from
the early twentieth century), along both racial and nonracial
lines.44 Perhaps most tellingly, none of the justices seemed willing to describe, much less embrace, the thrust of the LDF's argument-that the death penalty remained on the books largely
because of its racially discriminatory administration.145 Indeed,
Marshall's hypothesis that most American citizens would reject
the death penalty if they only knew about its discriminatory
administration seemed in considerable tension with the LDF's
claim that most Americans (and legislatures) tolerated the retention of the death penalty precisely because they were aware
of its exclusive application against societal outcasts, including
racial minorities.146
See Furman, 408 US at 364-66 (Marshall concurring).
Compare id at 366 (Marshall concurring) ("Their impotence leaves them victims
of a sanction that the wealthier, better-represented, just-as-guilty person can escape."),
with id at 256 (Douglas concurring):
142

143

A law that stated that anyone making more than $50,000 would be exempt
from the death penalty would plainly fall, as would a law that in terms said
that blacks, those who never went beyond the fifth grade in school, those who
made less than $3,000 a year, or those who were unpopular or unstable should
be the only people executed.
See id at 248-52 (Douglas concurring); id at 364-65 (Marshall concurring).
145 See text accompanying notes 115-17.
146 See Aikens Petitioner's Brief at *54 (cited in note 115) ("Whether it happen by
accident or design that penalties of this sort fall most furiously upon the poor and
144
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When Furman invalidated prevailing capital statutes, many
participants and observers believed that they had witnessed the
end of the American death penalty. Had Furman stuck-with
states choosing to forgo redrafting their statutes or the Court
invalidating any such efforts--claims regarding the American
death penalty's racially discriminatory administration would
have been buried alongside the death penalty itself. The LDF
would have known, at some level, that concerns about racial justice informed the Court's decisions, but the record of opinions
would have reflected a sort of euphemistic code, with repeated
condemnations of "arbitrariness," "wantonness," and "freakishness," rather than many forthright condemnations of racial
147
prejudice.
But just as Warren had underestimated the backlash that
would follow the Court's nonaccusatory opinion in Brown, which
had whitewashed the long-standing connections between chattel
slavery, white-supremacist ideology, and state segregation of
schools,148 the Furman Court misread public attitudes toward
capital punishment and the willingness of states to acquiesce in
judicial abolition, even if framed in a similarly nonaccusatory
manner. In the four years following Furman, thirty-five states
reenacted capital statutes, and the Court agreed to address
whether death sentences obtained under five of the new capital
schemes could be imposed consistent with the Eighth
Amendment.149
In many ways, the litigation before the Court was a reprise
of Furman. The LDF controlled the litigation (although its lawyers were not named as lead counsel on the petitioners' briefs).
The LDF strategy was again to emphasize the unreviewable discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty, despite the
promulgation of aggravating factors to guide sentencing discretion in many of the new statutes and the mandatory
friendless and upon racial minorities, the supposed 'acceptance' of the penalty is
nonetheless a product of the outcast nature of those who bear the brunt of it.").
147 In his discussion of Furman,Professor Evan Mandery argues that, "whatever the
justices may have intended, everyone understood Furman as having been about race."
Mandery, A Wild Justice at 276 (cited in note 66).
148 See Jordan Steiker, Book Review, American Icon: Does It Matter What the Court
Said in Brown?, 81 Tex L Rev 305, 312-15 (2002) (discussing the mild tone of Brown and
the Court's failure to speak more clearly and forthrightly about the "true" meaning of
segregation).
149 See generally Gregg v Georgia,428 US 153 (1976); Proffitt v Florida, 428 US 242
(1976); Jurek v Texas, 428 US 262 (1976); Woodson v North Carolina,428 US 280 (1976);
Roberts v Louisiana,428 US 325 (1976).
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requirement of death upon conviction of first-degree murder in
others. Whereas the Furman briefs emphasized the absence of
standards within the capital statutes themselves, the 1976
briefs pointed toward the numerous opportunities for unconstrained police, prosecutorial, and juror discretion to withhold
the death penalty prior to sentencing, even under North
Carolina's and Louisiana's purportedly mandatory statutes. 150
As in Furman,the petitioners' briefs sought to document the
role of racial discrimination in capital litigation. Though none of
the five cases involved a capital conviction for rape, each petitioner's brief indicated that "[riacial discrimination in the application of the death penalty for rape ha[d] been sufficiently blatant to allow of overwhelming statistical proof."11 Having
worked so extensively with Wolfgang to produce the rape study,
the LDF was aware of the empirical challenges involved in producing a comparable study for murder, especially given the rarity of death sentences and the costs of designing and implementing an empirically sound study.152 That recognition prompted the
petitioners' concession that a "similarly overwhelming comprehensive demonstration of racial discrimination ha[d] concededly
not yet been made in connection with the death penalty for
murder."153 But the petitioners nonetheless insisted that the
"frequently discriminatory infliction of death can decently be
viewed only as an enduring cause of national shame"54 and that
"very strong evidence" of such continuing discrimination in
murder cases could be inferred from a variety of empirical studies, informed observation of the capital systems, and "the intuitive implausibility of the hypothesis that the same people,

150 See, for example, Brief for Petitioner, Gregg v Georgia, No 74-6257, *13 (US filed

Feb 26, 1976) (available on Westlaw at 1976 WL 194055) ("Gregg Petitioner's Brief')
("[T]he sentencing stage is only one of the many stages in the criminal process subject to
unrestrained and arbitrary discretion."); Brief for Petitioner, Roberts u Louisiana, No
75-5844, *37 (US filed Feb 25, 1976) ('Roberts Petitioner's Brief'):
The notion that the death penalty is mandatory "if the jury brings in a verdict
of guilty" of first degree murder depends (in the vernacular) upon a very big
"if"; and, even then, death is not by any means the inevitable or predictable
outcome of the case. For "[dliscretion permeates the entire criminal justice system, from police detection and arrest, through prosecutorial charging and plea
negotiation, to jury deliberation, appellate reconsideration, and executive
pardon."
151 See, for example, Gregg Petitioner's Brief at *25a n 50 (cited in note 150).
152 See Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual at 76-78 (cited in note 73).
153 Gregg Petitioner's Brief at *25a n 50 (cited in note 150).
154 Id at *25a-27a.
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operating through the same procedures in rape and murder cases, have practiced racial discrimination in the rape cases but
risen scrupulously above its influence when the charge is murder."' 55 The petitioners also noted the "sobering" fact that the
percentage of nonwhites on death row post-Furman was not significantly different than pre-Furman.156Despite the fact that the
death-sentenced inmates in three of the five cases were whiteGregg (Georgia), Proffitt (Florida), and Jurek (Texas)-several of
the briefs included appendices listing the race of the defendants
in all post-Furman cases within the state yielding capital
verdicts. 157 In addition, the petitioners alluded to recent findings
that blacks faced harsher punishment in cases involving white
victims,158 representing a shift from the focus on the race of the
defendant in earlier cases. The overall message of the petitioners' briefs regarding racial discrimination was clear. The petitioners' briefs in both Gregg and Jurek concluded their passages
regarding racial discrimination with the following evocative
plea: "The time is too late now to rectify the errors of the past;
such, of course, is the nature of capital punishment. It is not too
late-nor is it too early-to prevent the repetition of those errors
in the future."159
The issue of race was particularly salient in the amicus
briefs. The LDF filed a brief in Gregg on its own behalf, indicating in its statement of interest that its experience "in handling
capital cases over a period of many years convinced [it] that the
death penalty is customarily applied in a discriminatory manner
against racial minorities and the economically underprivileged."160 The LDF went further, arguing that "the evil of discrimination was not merely adventitious, but was rooted in the
very nature of capital punishment."161 Amnesty International
filed an amicus brief in each of the five cases, making a similar
155 Id at *25a n 50.
156 Id at *28a n 51.
157 See, for example, Brief for Petitioner, Jurek v Texas, No 75-5394, Appendix 1 (US
filed Feb 26, 1976) (available on Westlaw at 1976 WL 181478) ("Jurek Petitioner's
Brief"); Roberts Petitioner's Brief at Appendix A (cited in note 150); Brief for Petitioners,
Woodson v North Carolina,No 75-5491, Appendix A (US filed Feb 26, 1976) (available on
Westlaw at 1976 AIL 181483).
158 Gregg Petitioner's Brief at *25a n 50 (cited in note 150).
159 Id at *27a-28a; Jurek Petitioner's Brief at *82-83 (cited in note 157).
160 Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc as Amicus
Curiae, Gregg v Georgia, No 74-6257, *1 (US filed Feb 25, 1967) (available on Westlaw at
1976 WL 178715).
161 Id at *1-2.
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point by explaining that it "is the worldwide experience of
Amnesty International that the death penalty is applied in a
highly discriminatory fashion against ethnic and religious minorities, against political prisoners, [and] against the disadvantaged.162 On the other side, in an extensive amicus brief rejecting the proposition that the death penalty is unconstitutional
per se, the United States devoted an entire section to the proposition that "capital punishment is not imposed on the basis of
race.163 The brief, filed by then-solicitor general Robert Bork, is
best known for its claim of empirical support for deterrence,164

an argument that appeared central to the Court's ultimate embrace of the death penalty as a permissible punishment in three
of the cases. 165 But the brief also engaged the empirical studies
that the petitioners had cited to support claims of racial bias.166
According to the United States, those studies did not support a
claim of continuing racial discrimination in murder cases, as
they focused primarily on discrimination in cases litigated at a
time when blacks were excluded from jury service.167 Similarly,
the United States "[did] not question" the conclusion of
Wolfgang's study of racial discrimination in rape cases in the
South from 1945 to 1965 but rather argued that the study neither proved continuing discrimination in such cases nor similar
discrimination in murder cases. 168 The brief also foreshadowed
some vulnerabilities of framing the constitutional claim against
the death penalty on racial grounds, arguing that none of the defendants offered evidence of racial discrimination in their individual cases and noting that "the possibility that racial
discrimination exists upon occasion in the criminal justice

162 Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae and Brief of Amnesty International as Amicus Curiae, Gregg v Georgia, No 74-6257, *3 (US filed Feb 25, 1976) (available on Westlaw at 1976 WL 178716).
163 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Gregg v Georgia, No 74-6257, *65
(US filed Mar 25, 1976) (available on Westlaw at 1976 WL 194056) ("Gregg US Brief')
(capitalization altered).
164

See id at *34.

See Gregg, 428 US at 184 (concluding that, although statistical evidence regarding the deterrent effects of the death penalty are "inconclusive," the "death penalty is
undoubtedly a significant deterrent" for some); Furman, 408 US at 301 (supporting the
argument that marginal deterrence is a justification for the death penalty despite the
lack of conclusive statistical findings of its effectiveness); Roberts, 428 US at 354-55
(same).
166 See Gregg US Brief at Appendix A (cited in note 163).
165

167

Id at *66.

168

Id at *4a-5a, Appendix A.
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system is not an argument against the penalty imposed upon
petitioners."169
The Court subsequently upheld the "guided discretion"
statutes and invalidated the "mandatory" ones.170 Given the
widespread reauthorization of the death penalty in many states,
the Court could not credit the view that the death penalty was
inconsistent with prevailing standards of decency. 171 Nor was the
Court prepared to conclude that the newly designed means of
guiding sentencing discretion were incapable of ameliorating the
"arbitrariness" and "caprice" of the old standardless-discretion
schemes.172 More broadly, the Court maintained that states
could validly invoke deterrence and retribution as grounds for
retaining the death penalty.173 Strikingly absent from the decisions is any mention of the problem of racial discrimination.
Douglas was no longer on the Court, and Marshall's dissent focused on the weakness of the deterrence claim and the inadequacy of retribution to justify capital punishment. 174 Brennan,
the only other dissenter, wrote in abstract terms about how the
death penalty denies human dignity.175 Though the opinions collectively occupied slightly fewer pages than those in Furman
and its companion cases, it is nonetheless remarkable that concerns about racial discrimination were never voiced or addressed
in the 210 or so pages of analysis that would answer, for the first
(and, to date, only) time, the question whether the American
death penalty is a constitutional form of punishment. The absence of race is especially notable given that the Court chose
several states from the Deep South as the locus of the five cases
(Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Florida, and Texas).176
The Court's decisions endorsing three of the new capital
schemes and the death penalty as a permissible punishment

169 Id at *68.
170 Banner, The Death Penalty at 274-75 (cited in note 8). Compare Woodson, 428
US at 305 (declaring a mandatory-death-penalty statute unconstitutional); Roberts, 428
US at 336 (same), with Gregg, 428 US at 206-07 (upholding a statute that guided the
jury's discretion with aggravating or mitigating circumstances).
171 See Gregg, 428 US at 179 (Stewart) (plurality) (noting that statutory developments "undercut substantially the assumptions upon which [the standards-of-decency
argument] rested").
172 Id at 203 (Stewart) (plurality).
173 See id at 182-86.
174 See id at 231-41 (Marshall dissenting).
175 See Gregg, 428 US at 227-31 (Brennan dissenting).
176 See generally id; Roberts, 428 US 325; Woodson, 428 US 280; Proffitt, 428 US
242; Jurek, 428 US 262.
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were issued in July 1976, at the end of the 1975 Term. When the
Court returned to begin the 1976 Term, it immediately agreed to
address the question that Goldberg had broached more than a
decade earlier-whether the death penalty was permissible as
applied to rape.17 7 The grant was encouraging to the LDF; with
the Court's invalidation of the mandatory schemes, Georgia
alone authorized capital punishment for the rape of an adult
woman, 178 and it seemed unlikely that the Court would engage
with the issue if it were inclined to uphold the practice. Interestingly, the Court selected a white inmate's case as the vehicle to
address the issue. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Court
paid close attention to the varying facts and procedural postures
of the underlying cases as it decided which inmates raising
common claims would be the face of the claims, as opposed to
those whose cases would simply be held pending resolution of
the issue. Chief Justice Warren Burger, for example, unsuccessfully sought to include an extremely aggravated Georgia case in
the 1976 litigation because he thought that the high level of aggravation would convince the Court to resurrect capital punishment.179 Justice Lewis Powell, on the other hand, wanted to exclude Woodson from the 1976 cases 80 because Woodson was
8
black and his victim was white. '
That the Court chose Coker, a white rapist, as the face of
the claim strongly suggested that the Court wanted to avoid racial bias as the primary or even a significant ground for the decision. If the Court had believed the underlying practice to be
racially discriminatory and had wanted to invoke that fact as a
basis for relief, the presence of a white defendant would complicate the decision because it would require the Court to explain
why discrimination in other cases justified overturning Coker's
death sentence (exactly the sort of problem that Bork highlighted in his amicus brief in Gregg82). Moreover, as Professor Sheri
Lynn Johnson notes in her account of the Coker litigation, at the
time that Coker sought certiorari, the Court had petitions for
certiorari pending in two other Georgia rape cases with black
defendants raising the same claim; her review of the records in

177 See Coker v Georgia, 429 US 815 (1976) (granting certiorari).
178 See Coker v Georgia, 433 US 584, 584, 615 (1976).
179 See Mandery, A Wild Justice at 345 (cited in note 66).
180 See note 149.

181 See Mandery, A Wild Justice at 344 (cited in note 66).
182 See Gregg US Brief at *68 (cited in note 163).
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those cases led her to conclude that the race of the defendant
was the only significant ground of distinction.183
Despite the signal reflected in the Court's choice of Coker,
the LDF emphasized racial discrimination in its brief. The LDF
documented in a chart the declining use of the death penalty to
punish rape, identifying the number of executions for rape per
year since 1946 and separating white and black offenders.184 The
LDF discussed historical evidence supporting the claim that, "in
Georgia, the death penalty[] for rape was specifically devised as

a punishment for the rape of white women by black

men."185

Citing the Wolfgang study, the LDF argued that "[r]ecent statistical studies have proved the fact of discrimination conclusively."186 Ultimately, the LDF argued that acceptance of the death
penalty for rape rested on "racial, not penal, considerations,"187
and that, "where race does not enter the picture, its acceptance
is positively aberrational."18 Hence, just as in Furman, the LDF
insisted that racial prejudice and discriminatory enforcement facilitated the continued retention of a practice that society otherwise would already have rejected.189
An amicus brief filed on behalf of the leading advocacy
groups for women's equality-including the National Organization for Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund and the
Women's Law Project-reinforced the claim of racial bias by asserting that the practice of punishing rape with death was tied
to Southern traditions that "valued white women according to
their purity and chastity and assigned them exclusively to white
men."190 The brief, authored by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, powerfully
exposed the ways in which the death penalty for rape fundamentally rested on both sexist and racist beliefs. The brief detailed

183

See Johnson, Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past at 195 (cited in note 26).

184 Brief for Petitioner, Coker v Georgia, No 75-5444, *52 (US filed Dec 9, 1976)

(available on Westlaw at 1976 WL 181481) ("Coker Petitioner's Brief').
185 Id at *54 (citation omitted).
186 Id at *55-56.
187 Id at *56.
188 Coker Petitioner's Brief at *56 (cited in note 184).
189 See id ("This freakishly rare and racially disproportionate imposition of the
death penalty for the crime of rape in Georgia has insulated an excessive punishment
from the scrutiny of enlightened public conscience.").
190 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education
Fund, the Women's Law Project, the Center for Women Policy Studies, the Women's Legal Defense Fund, and Equal Rights Advocates, Inc, Coker v Georgia,No 75-5444, *6 (US
filed Dec 3, 1976) (available on Westlaw at 1976 WL 181482) ("Coker NOW Brief).
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how the crime of rape was long regarded as a crime against the
property of a woman's husband or father. 191 It described efforts
by women in the 1930s to bring an end to lynching by mobs that
"commit acts of violence and lawlessness in the name of
women."192 It also described the racially discriminatory laws
(noted above) that treated black-on-white rapes differently than
other rapes in antebellum Georgia. 19 It concluded that "the
death penalty for rape is an outgrowth of both male patriarchal
views of women no longer seriously maintained by society[ ] and
gross racial injustice created in part out of that patriarchal
foundation."194 On the state's side, the respondent's brief omitted
any reference to rape in its lukewarm defense of its practice,
conceding that "Georgia, of course, has no interest in executing
all rapists" (exactly the point made by the LDF) and suggesting
that "at some future date" the practice might be deemed excessive. 195 The state's nonresponsiveness to claims of racial discrimination was exacerbated by its unexplored declaration at the end
of the brief that "[t]radition and history support the retention of
the death penalty for rape."196 Indeed.
The Court declared the death penalty "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape" and
"therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."'197 The plurality
devised a new methodology for gauging excessiveness, looking
first at the current judgment reflected in state statutes and jury
decisionmaking.198 The plurality observed that the decline in
state capital-rape statutes (which Georgia attributed to the
Court's intervention in Furman)signaled declining societal support for the punishment, as did the relatively few capital verdicts obtained in Georgia post-Furman.199 The plurality then
brought its own judgment "to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."200
Borrowing from a theme in Ginsburg's amicus brief, the
191 See id at *11.

192 Id at *10 (citation omitted).
193 See id at *16-19.
194 Coker NOW Brief at *19 (cited in note 190).
195 Brief for Respondent, Coker v Georgia, No 75-5444, *12, 23 (US filed Jan 14,
1977) (available on Westlaw at 1977 WL 189754).
196 Id at *23.

197 Coker, 433 US at 592 (White) (plurality).
198 See id at 594-97 (White) (plurality).
199 Id at 595-96 (White) (plurality) (noting only six death sentences in the sixtythree rape convictions reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court since 1973).
200 Id at 597 (White) (plurality).
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plurality concluded that the crime of rape "does not compare
with murder" in terms of "moral depravity and of the injury to
the person and to the public."201 Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result, but they did so based on their categorical
rejection of the death penalty as a permissible punishment.202
Neither the plurality nor the dissenting opinions made any
reference to race. Given the long-standing historical connection
between race and capital punishment for rape, 203 the role of the
LDF in developing empirical evidence of racial discrimination in
the Wolfgang study of rape cases, 20 4 the acknowledgement of the
20 5
persuasiveness of that study in Bork's brief in the 1976 cases,
and the continued emphasis on racial bias by the litigants in
Coker,206 it is astonishing that concerns about race did not merit
even a passing reference in the ultimate Coker opinions. Coker
represents the height of the Court's avoidance of race, because
Georgia's continued authorization of death for rape was simply
impossible to explain or understand without examining the racial history surrounding that practice.
Coker is, in many respects, the appropriate bookend to
Rudolph. In the fourteen years between those two decisions, the
Court embarked on a remarkable project to engage with the constitutionality of the American death penalty. The Court initiated
the conversation and ultimately produced the first moratorium
on executions in the United States, followed by the first-and
only-brief period of judicial abolition.207 Even as it initiated the
conversation, the Court took great pains to separate the questions of race and capital punishment. Goldberg and his colleagues declined to mention race in their initial inquiry into the
appropriateness of death for rape. The Court refused to grant
certiorari in Maxwell on the issue of the racially discriminatory
administration of capital punishment for rape in the South and
declined to respond to claims of racial discrimination in several
of its foundational cases, including Witherspoon. And when the
Court finally invalidated prevailing statutes in Furman, the justices who supported that result were reluctant to suggest that
Coker, 433 US at 598 (White) (plurality).
See id at 600 (Brennan concurring); id at 601 (Marshall concurring).
203 See text accompanying notes 26-28.
204 See text accompanying notes 73-78.
205 See text accompanying notes 164-68.
206 See text accompanying notes 184-88.
207 See generally Furman, 408 US 238 (resulting in a de facto moratorium on the
death penalty in America).
201

202
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the black petitioners (two of whom had been sentenced to death
for raping white women) might have been victims of racial discrimination and instead highlighted the generally "wanton" and
"freakish" nature of American death sentences. 20 When the
death penalty was resurrected in 1976, the Court selected three
white inmates to serve as the face of the constitutional challenges to the Georgia, Florida, and Texas schemes and ultimately
upheld the new schemes without addressing the lingering question of racial discrimination. Coker followed quickly on the heels
of the 1976 cases, as the Court wanted to excise the most obviously objectionable part of what was now going to be an ongoing
practice. But, in shoring up the death penalty against continuing fears of racial discrimination, the Court managed to say
nothing about the racial discrimination that the justices-and
everybody else-knew that they were addressing.
III. EXPLAINING THE GAP
The Court's deafening silence on the subject of race in its
foundational capital punishment cases is striking but, on reflection, perhaps not altogether surprising. Ample reasons of various kinds-strategic, institutional, ideological, and psychological-help explain what otherwise might appear to be a baffling
obtuseness. Not every consideration applies to every justice in
every case, though more than one explanation might be at work
at any given time, even with regard to the work of individual
justices. Moreover, not every consideration necessarily operated
at a conscious level. Rather, what follows is an attempt to consider why a "race-neutral" constitutional approach to the issue of
capital punishment may have been appealing to the Supreme
Court even-perhaps especially-in the racially charged era of
the 1960s and 1970s.
First, as a strategic matter, the Court had already committed itself to a challenging racial-justice agenda with regard to
school desegregation in Brown in 1954. Though the Court
bought time with its 1955 decision in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka2° 9 ("Brown II"), which promoted a gradualist "all
deliberate speed" approach to the enforcement of its desegregation mandate,210 the Court returned to school desegregation in

208
209
210

Id at 310.
349 US 294 (1955).
Id at 301.
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the late 1960s and early 1970s at exactly the same time that it
took on capital punishment. In 1968, the same year as the
Court's death-penalty decision in Witherspoon, the Court decided Green v County School Board,211 holding that a Virginia
school board's "freedom of choice" plan was not adequate to promote compliance with Brown's desegregation mandate.212 And in
1971, just one year prior to Furman, the Court decided Swann v
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,213 upholding courtordered busing as an equitable remedy to achieve integration in
a large public school system in North Carolina.214 These controversial rulings, though more publicly palatable at that time than
they would have been in the 1950s, 2 15 embroiled the Court, the
public, and the NAACP (which litigated both cases) in controversy, in the South and beyond.
In light of the Court's ongoing role in the schooldesegregation battle, it is no wonder that Chief Justice Warren,
the architect of the Court's unanimous opinion in Brown, hesitated to add capital punishment to the simmering pot of racial
issues. Black murderers and rapists presented a much less sympathetic face for civil rights enforcement than schoolchildren.
Not only did Warren refuse to be a fourth vote for certiorari in
Rudolph, but he also insisted that Justice Goldberg cut the race
argument out of his dissent from denial, despite the prominence
of that argument in the memorandum that Goldberg had circulated to the Court.216 Warren explained to Goldberg that the public would not accept any softening of the punishment for rape
given widespread white fears of sexual violence by blacks.217 The
same concern for public sensibilities led Warren to delay confronting the constitutionality of laws prohibiting interracial
marriage, which were finally invalidated in 1967 in Loving v
Virginia.218
In addition to protecting its ongoing project of school desegregation from controversial entanglements, the Court doubtless
sought (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) to move on the issue of
capital punishment in a way that would avoid generating a new
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

391 US 430 (1968).
Id at 441.
402 US 1 (1971).
Id at 30.
See Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 341-43 (cited in note 1).
See Mandery, A Wild Justice at 28 (cited in note 66).
See id.
388 US 1 (1967). See also Mandery, A Wild Justice at 28 (cited in note 66).
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version of the backlash that had greeted its handiwork in the
school-desegregation context. There was good reason for the
Court to worry that constitutional limitation or abolition of capital punishment for explicitly racial reasons would inspire morespirited public resistance than apparently race-neutral
interventions. First, the death penalty was more popular, widely
authorized, and vigorously employed in the South than in any
other region of the country. 219 The Warren Court's desegregation
rulings and its criminal procedure revolution already seemed to
target Southern institutions, and these decisions engendered
substantial backlash in that region.220 The Court might well
have feared that a ruling against capital punishment that focused on its racial aspects would further stoke fires that were
already burning, especially given that the only non-Southern respondent (California) in Furman dropped out before the Court's
decision when the case was mooted by a state constitutional ruling on the death penalty.221
Moreover, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, crime rates
were rising across the country, especially in inner-city, minority
communities.222 The race riots of the late 1960s and the increasingly militant stance of black radicals also fed growing fears of
black violence.223 Indeed, the Republican Party sought to capitalize on these fears by using crime as a racially coded wedge issue
to appeal to Southern white Democrats as part of its "Southern
strategy" to convince "Dixiecrats" to switch party affiliation.224
Rising crime rates and fear of black crime not only increased the
likelihood of political backlash to a race-based judicial curtailment of capital punishment, but they also may have engendered
ambivalence among some of the justices about the underlying
racial discrimination claim. While the LDF had very strong evidence-based both on raw numbers and on Wolfgang's statistical analysis-of racial discrimination in the use of the death
219
220
221

See Banner, The Death Penalty at 228-30 (cited in note 8).
See Garland, PeculiarInstitution at 222-23, 234-36 (cited in note 79).
See Aikens v California,406 US 813, 814 (1972) (dismissing the case as moot in

light of the California Supreme Court's decision striking down the California death penalty in People v Anderson, 493 P2d 880 (Cal 1972)).
222 See Garland, PeculiarInstitution at 239 (cited in note 79); Mandery, A Wild Justice at 264-65 (cited in note 66).
223 See Yohuru Williams, 'A Red, Black and Green Liberation Jumpsuit: Roy
Wilkins, the Black Panthers,and the Conundrum of Black Power, in Peniel E. Joseph, ed,
The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era 167, 175-76
(Routledge 2006).
224 See Garland, PeculiarInstitutionat 238-44 (cited in note 79).
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penalty for rape, the same was not true for murder, which comprised the majority of capital prosecutions.25 The raw numbers
on the race of capital-murder defendants did not present the
same striking prima facie case for an inference of discrimination
as the rape numbers did-a point that California made in its
brief in the McGautha litigation226 and that then-solicitor general Bork noted in his brief for the United States in Gregg.227 Nor
did the LDF have the resources to undertake the expansiveand expensive-statistical analysis of capital murder necessary
to prove its discrimination case, as the LDF acknowledged in its
own brief.228 Consequently, the Court may have entertained the
alternative inference explicitly urged by Georgia in Furmanthat the overrepresentation of blacks on death row was attributable to their overrepresentation among murderers.229
Given the difference in the strength of the discrimination inference with regard to capital prosecutions for rape and those for
murder, the Court may well have preferred to deal with the issue by eliminating the most obviously problematic cases on some
other ground, thus avoiding the need to dig deep into the statistical morass. This explanation fits perfectly with what the Court
in fact did: only a year after Gregg, the Court constitutionally
invalidated the death penalty for rape on proportionality
grounds in Coker-a case with a white defendant and a decision
devoid of any discussion of race. 23 0 A Court sympathetic to the
racial discrimination claim in capital-rape cases but skeptical of
it in its broader form could thus solve the most obviously troubling racial aspects of capital punishment without committing
See Powell, The Death Penalty in the South at 204 (cited in note 11).
See McGautha Respondents Brief at *74 (cited in note 111) (stating that "all indications are that a defendant's race plays no part" in jury decisionmaking in California
based on raw first-degree murder statistics).
227 See Gregg US Brief at *66-67 (cited in note 163).
228 See Gregg Petitioner's Brief at *25a n 50 (cited in note 150) (recognizing that a
"similarly overwhelming comprehensive demonstration of racial discrimination ha[d]
concededly not yet been made in connection with the death penalty for murder"). To
make its argument regarding racial discrimination in murder cases, the LDF was left to
extrapolate from Wolfgang's rape analysis and to suggest what would become apparent
only a decade later, after David Baldus's statistical analysis of capital murder-that the
lack of strikingly apparent discrimination in the murder context was largely attributable
to a strong race-of-the-victim bias. See Garland, Peculiar Institution at 282 (cited in note
79). The bias toward capital prosecutions when murder victims were white tended to
counterbalance the bias toward prosecutions of black murder defendants, given the
intraracial nature of most homicides.
229 See note 122 and accompanying text.
230 Coker, 433 US at 592.
225
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itself on the larger, technically fraught issue of what constitutes
adequate proof of racial discrimination in sentencing outcomes.
The technical expertise needed to evaluate claims of racial
discrimination may also have made avoidance of the issue more
attractive to the Court. As the more sophisticated litigants recognized, raw numerical disparities (of the kind referenced by
Justice Douglas in his solo concurrence in Furman231) are insufficient to prove discrimination; rather, further analysis is necessary to demonstrate that the disparities are caused by racial
discrimination as opposed to other, nonracial factors-such as
differences in crime rates, differences in the severity of the
crimes committed, or differences in the records or other characteristics of the offenders. The best tool to sort through these possibilities-multiple-regression analysis-is difficult for nonstatisticians to use or understand, and the justices may have
appropriately doubted their capacity to evaluate the reliability
of such evidence. Justice Lewis Powell, the author of the majority opinion in McCleskey v Kemp,232 upholding a death sentence
against a statistical claim of racial discrimination,33 acknowledged in a memorandum to one of his law clerks that his "understanding of statistical analysis-particularly what is called
regression analysis-range[d] from limited to zero."234 The move
that Powell ultimately made in McCleskey-raising questions
about the methodological soundness of the statistical study but
ultimately deciding the case on legal grounds, assuming without
deciding the validity of the study-is a move that recurs in the
Court's constitutional decisionmaking.235 Powell, who joined the
231
232
233
234

See Furman, 408 US at 249-51 (Douglas concurring).
481 US 279 (1987).
See Garland, PeculiarInstitution at 282 (cited in note 79).
Justice Lewis Powell, Memorandum to Law Clerk *27 (Sept 16, 1986), archived

at http://perma.cc/2F2T-DBQZ.
235 For example, in Witherspoon, the Court put off until another day whether there
was sufficient statistical proof that death-qualified juries were skewed toward conviction, declaring the data that the petitioners offered on the matter "too tentative and
fragmentary." Witherspoon, 391 US at 517. When the Court finally reached the issue, it
assumed for the sake of argument that the statistical proof was vald but decided the
case on legal rather than statistical grounds. See Lockhart v McCre, 476 US 162, 173
(1986):
Having identified some of the more serious problems with McCree's studies,
however, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both
methodologically valid and adequate to establish that "death qualification" in
fact produces juries somewhat more "conviction-prone" than "non-deathqualified" juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution does not prohibit
the States from "death qualifying" juries in capital cases.
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Court just in time for the Furman litigation, was certainly not
alone among the justices in his uneasiness with statistical proof.
As a result, many of the justices may have felt that their personal legitimacy as jurists was threatened in cases involving

statistical

proof,236

and thus they may have preferred to render

decisions on purely legal rather than statistical grounds. This
dynamic may also have informed the Court's ultimate conclusion
in McCleskey that judging in general-and with regard to claims
of racial discrimination in particular-requires evaluating proof
in individual cases rather than examining broader statistical
evidence.237
In addition to concerns about the legitimacy of their judicial
role, the justices may have avoided the racial aspects of the capital punishment litigation in part because of concerns about the
legitimacy of the Court as an institution. Addressing a controversial topic like capital punishment through the lens of procedural justice, as illustrated most clearly by the decisions of
swing justices Stewart and White in Furman, may have seemed
less socially divisive than applying the lens of racial justice.
Moreover, the procedural-justice focus may have seemed more
distinctively judicial and less potentially legislative than a focus
on racial equality. The workings (and failings) of the judicial
process are well within the special expertise of courts, in contrast to the evaluation of expert, technical proof of racial discrimination in outcomes, which may seem more suited to the
legislative venue. The Court's timing of its entrance into the
capital punishment fray was important with respect to this consideration. The Warren Court had faced frequent and vociferous
criticism for stepping beyond the appropriate boundaries of what
was supposed to be the "least dangerous branch" of government,
given that the judiciary controls neither army nor purse. 238 The
Court's foundational capital punishment cases came on the heels
of this criticism, in the waning days of the Warren Court and the
early days of the Burger Court. Thus, the swing justices may
236 See Sundby, 10 Ohio St J Crim L at 14 (cited in note 234) (describing Justice
Powell's "aversion" to evaluating the statistical analysis presented in McCleskey, which
was exacerbated by a clerk's memorandum criticizing the lower courts for failing to understand the Baldus study).
237 See id at 13. See also McCleskey, 481 US at 297.
238 See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale 2d ed 1986) (mounting one of the most rigorous criticisms of the Warren Court's judicial activism and arguing for a policy of judicial
restraint).
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have sought to dispose of the death-penalty issue in the way
least likely to feed into this critique--once again unsuccessfully,
given that the dissenting justices repeatedly sounded the theme
that the Court was inappropriately intruding into the legislative
sphere.239
Interestingly, the South African Constitutional Court's 1995
decision invalidating capital punishment under the postapartheid
constitution,24 in the very first case presented to it for review,
also largely eschewed race-based argumentation241-a silence
perhaps even more surprising than that of the US Supreme
Court, given the overt and extreme racism of the apartheid regime. In an exploration of the reasons for the South African
Court's apparent avoidance of race in its ruling on capital punishment, one commentator suggests a similar motivation to that
posited above-that is, to establish the Court as the appropriate
adjudicator of the issue (in contrast to Parliament), a motivation
especially strong in the context of establishing an inaugural constitutional court with the power of judicial review.242 "In this
setting, the Justices may have sought to elevate purely legal decisionmaking over considerations that require the pragmatic,
fact-based wisdom of legislators."243 Under this view, the South
African Court sought "a lens that privileged the expertise and
position of the judiciary" so as to "legitimize[ ] that body's elevation over its parliamentary rival."244
On a broader ideological level, the US Supreme Court's relative silence on the issue of race in capital punishment was of a
piece with its approaches in the two most closely related constitutional areas-the regulation of criminal justice and the promotion of racial equality. In the broader criminal justice area, the
Court presaged its approach to capital punishment by largely
avoiding explicit discussion of race, even in cases in which the
racial context was undeniably significant.245 More generally,
See, for example, Furman,408 US at 403-05 (Burger dissenting).
State v Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S Afr).
241 See Owen Roberts, Race-Blind Abolition: Makwanyane's Unused Inequality Argument *1 (unpublished manuscript, Apr 2014) (on file with authors).
242 See id at *24-25.
243 Id at *24.
244 Id at *24-26.
245 The best example of this avoidance is the Court's decision in Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968), the case that incorporated the right to trial by jury. The opinion
talks in broad terms about the abstract value of juries, even while the accused was a
black teenager charged with assault for "slap[ping]" the arm of one of a group of four
white boys who were harassing two black boys; this altercation took place in the midst of
239

240
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instead of focusing on outcomes in the criminal justice contextthe kinds of punishments imposed, the length of criminal sentences, or the distribution of criminal penalties-the Court focused on the procedures by which punishment was imposed.246
The Warren Court viewed the most significant constitutional
problems with the American criminal-justice system as procedural ones and hoped to ameliorate them by extending the
rights to counsel and trial by jury and by regulating police interrogations and lineups. Consequently, it must have seemed natural, or at least plausible, to focus on procedural deficiencies in
the capital punishment system, even under the more outcomeoriented Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual
punishments rather than mandating any special procedural
protections.
In the context of constitutional litigation regarding racial
equality, the Court obviously did not eschew discussions of race,
but it did consistently express the hope that race-based remedies
were merely stopgap measures necessary to achieve a race-blind
future. For example, in the school-busing context, the Court referred to the court-ordered busing plan that it approved in 1971
as an "interim corrective measure" that would not necessarily
require yearly judicial monitoring or updating once desegregation was achieved.247 Similarly, in the affirmative action context,
the Court struck down the use of racial quotas in university admissions but upheld the voluntary use of race for the promotion
of diversity,248 a remedial measure that Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor later explicitly maintained should be "limited in
time"-specifically, to 25 years-before evolving into constitutionally favored "race-neutral" policies.249 This aspiration toward
a race-blind future, present even in the era in which the Court
most endorsed race-conscious remedial measures to effect the
constitutional guarantee of equality, made a race-neutral

a highly contested school-desegregation fight in one of the most racially divided parishes
in Louisiana. Id at 147, 151-58. See also generally Nancy J. King, Duncan v. Louisiana:
How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal Regulation of State Juries in Steiker, ed,
Criminal Procedure Stories 261 (cited in note 50) (describing the racial context of the
Duncan litigation).
246 See William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 74-85 (Belknap 2011) (describing and critiquing the procedural focus of the Bill of Rights).
247 Swann, 402 US at 27.
248 Regents of the University of Californiav Bakke, 438 US 265, 369 (1978).
249 Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 342-43 (2003).

2015]

The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race

285

approach to the constitutionality of capital punishment that
much more appealing.
Indeed, both the Court's commitment to procedural justice
and its aspiration toward a color-blind ideal reflect a larger and
deeper commitment, one more rooted in the 1960s and 1970s
than in the present-that is, the Court's deeply optimistic faith
in the constitutional perfectibility of social and legal institutions. To have invalidated the death penalty on the ground of
racial disparities in its administration would have betrayed this
faith by giving up hope that such disparities could be remedied
by the right procedural interventions or "interim corrective
measures.250 A race-based abolition of the death penalty would
have constituted an acknowledgement that the effects of institutionalized racism could not be erased by constitutional intervention-the very last message that the Supreme Court wanted to
send in the era of constitutionally mandated school desegregation and criminal procedure reform. The LDF's opponents cleverly and powerfully appealed to this reluctance by arguing that evidence of past disparities should be discounted in light of the
Court's own constitutional interventions. For example, Georgia
argued that inferences of current racial discrimination from past
disparities were not justified because "safeguards against arbitrariness or other lack of due process for disadvantaged persons
have increased substantially in the last several decades ... [in-

cluding] the right to effective assistance of counsel for the indigent."251 And Bork argued that "[t]he only studies that even inferentially suggest a possibility of racial discrimination were
conducted in the South during a time when blacks were often
excluded from grand and petit juries. They do not demonstrate
that discrimination persists now that blacks sit in judgment on
other blacks.252 Once again, the South African context offers a
similar dynamic-the new justices acted with the hope that conditions would improve with the official end of apartheid and the
250 Swann, 402 US at 27.
251 Furman Respondent's Brief at *80 (cited in note 121). See also Supplemental

Brief for Respondent, Furman v Georgia, No 69-5003, *14-15 (US filed Mar 25, 1972)
(available on Westlaw at 1972 WL 125855):
[I]t must be remembered that both Furman and Jackson were tried in the latter months of 1968, after the Georgia jury selection system was corrected to expunge the element of prima facie discrimination which arose from the use of
segregated tax digests as a source of jurors, by substituting the voter lists. The
potentiality of racially discriminatory juries was erased in both of these trials.
252 Gregg US Brief at *66 (cited in note 163).
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belief that "inequality ... may be curable in the long run"
through legal intervention.113
Even as the Court officially proclaimed the possibility of
equality through law, surely the justices entertained doubts
about the speed and completeness of change over time, especially given the baseline of long-standing racial inequality that the
Court started from in the 1960s and 1970s. In light of these entirely plausible doubts, the justices may have hesitated to treat
racial disparities as a ground for invalidating capital punishment because of the likelihood that similar disparities existed
and would continue to exist in the imposition of noncapital punishments-which could not simply be excised from the legal system like the single penalty of death. Indeed, when the Court finally squarely addressed the issue of racial disparities in capital
sentencing in McCleskey, this concern about the scope of the
remedy was paramount. As Powell explained, 'lVcCleskey's
claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system."254

These concerns must have been heightened by the

Court's decision to invalidate the use of capital punishment for
the crime of rape. The Court had seen the staggering statistics
on the race-based use of prosecutions for rape in the South, and
it could not possibly have believed that disparate charging and
sentencing in rape cases would disappear simply because the
death penalty was off the table. To invalidate the entire criminal-justice system if its workings could be shown-as they plausibly could-to be affected by racial prejudice would be unthinkable. But if the Court relied on racial disparities to invalidate
capital punishment, it would be forced to explain why similar
disparities must be accepted in the imposition of ordinary criminal punishment. The Court no doubt sought to avoid a public
announcement that racism is unavoidable and therefore must be
tolerated-both for the country's sake and for the justices' own
psychological comfort.
Indeed, the Court knew exactly what such a disheartening
announcement would sound like, as Justice Antonin Scalia had
circulated a memo to his fellow justices in McCleskey that suggested that he might write a concurrence along precisely these
lines. Scalia explained, "Since it is my view that the unconscious
253 Roberts, Race-Blind Abolition at *27, 28 (cited in note 241) (quotation marks
omitted), citing Makwanyane at T 185 (Didcott concurring).
254 McCleskey, 481 US at 314-15.
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operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is
real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof."255
Although Scalia never wrote this concurrence, his characteristic
bluntness revealed the Court's dilemma with regard to evidence
of racial disparities in capital sentencing. If the Court directly
addressed the issue and declared the statistical proof of racial
discrimination inadequate, then it would simply invite further
litigation, as armies of social scientists would seek to provide the
missing proof. If the Court declared the statistical proof adequate and granted relief, then it would have to face the inevitable challenge to the entire criminal-justice system without the
possibility of granting similar relief. The McCleskey Court, by
assuming without deciding the soundness of the Baldus study
but denying individual relief based on statistical proof, tried to
have it both ways-to avoid the enormity of the remedy sought
for systemic discrimination while still maintaining that the
Constitution prohibited racial discrimination in individual cases.
As the Court must have predicted, the McCleskey decision
proved controversial not least because of its disingenuousness.256
The remedial difficulties that the Court ultimately addressed in
McCleskey must have been apparent in the litigation regarding
racial disparities in the Court's foundational cases, thus offering
yet another powerful motivation to steer the discussions and
ground the decisions in race-neutral terms.
Thus, the Court's focus on issues such as death qualification
in Witherspoon, arbitrariness in swing Furman concurrences,
and proportionality in Coker-without any sustained discussion
of the racial significance of these particular legal issues or of the
broader racial context-turns out to be less mysterious than it
appears at first blush. As the litigants pounded on the racial issues in the Court's foundational capital punishment cases, the
justices had ample opportunity to consider the costs, along many
dimensions, of opening a public discussion about the evidence
and constitutional significance of racial disparities in the administration of the death penalty. The Court's failure to engage robustly in this discussion could not have been inadvertent, and
255 Justice Antonin Scalia, Memorandum to the Conference Re: No. 84-6811McCleskey v. Kemp (Jan 6, 1987), available at Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall
Papers, McCleskey v Kemp file ("Memorandum from Scalia").
256 See Sundby, 10 Ohio St J Crim L at 33-35 (cited in note 234).
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thus its silence reflects the power of the kinds of considerations
that we have attempted here to unearth and flesh out.
IV. CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AVOIDANCE

What consequences flowed from the Court's avoidance of
race in its foundational decisions? As in Brown, the Court's various opinions, from Rudolph to Coker, offered a woefully incomplete picture of the underlying practice. The price of omitting a
discussion of race was to create the false impression that the
greatest failings of the American capital punishment system
could be found in discrete procedures (such as the death qualification of jurors, unitary trials, and the absence of guidance in
state capital statutes). Of course, the Court might have had good
reasons, both political and epistemological, for resisting the
most encompassing and speculative of the LDF's claims-that
the death penalty remained on the books largely because only
blacks and other marginal groups were caught in the execution
net. But even if the Court was not persuaded by that assertion,
it could have said much more about how race historically and at
that time informed decisions at every level, including legislative
selection of crimes punishable by death, prosecutorial decisions
to charge capitally in individual cases, judge and jury verdicts,
and appellate and executive discretionary outlets from the ultimate imposition of the punishment.
As discussed below, the failure to come to terms with race
has had complicated consequences for death-penalty jurisprudence, but, in a more basic sense, this failure disserved the
Court in its role as a chronicler of history and social and political
practices. Had the Court framed its constitutional regulation of
capital punishment against the backdrop of antebellum codes,
lynchings, mob-dominated trials, and disparate-enforcement
patterns, the Court would have done a much better job of explaining why the death penalty deserved the sustained attention
of the American judiciary. This would have been true even had
the Court ultimately framed its doctrines in nonracial terms.
Moreover, to the extent that the Court's silence about race was
calculated (as in Brown) to preserve the Court's capital and prevent popular backlash or resistance, it was spectacularly unsuccessful. As in Brown, the Court's general audience understood
that it was taking sides in a culture war over racial status even
as the Court omitted the history of deliberate discrimination
that offered the greatest justification for its interventions.
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In the short term, the Court's failure to acknowledge racial
discrimination in cases like Rudolph and Coker undermined the
strength of that claim when it arrived before the Court in the
late 1980s. As Professor Johnson persuasively argues, Coker
managed to erase the most racially discriminatory practice (punishing rape with death) without providing the racial context surrounding that decision; thus, when the Court finally engaged a
statistical study of racial discrimination in McCleskey, it was
presented with a much less racially skewed death penalty and
no "official" judicial record that race had ever played a substantial role in recent capital sentencing.27 As a result, the Court
was better able to give Georgia prosecutors and judges the benefit of the doubt and to "decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious."258 Johnson argues that a stronger opinion
in Coker documenting the race-of-the-victim effects in rape cases
would have made it more difficult to dismiss strong race-of-thevictim effects in the Baldus study-a dynamic that might have
been outcome determinative given the Court's 5-4 division.259
Perhaps so. But Justice Powell, the only available majority vote
in McCleskey, was undoubtedly aware of Wolfgang and the rape
studies even though they did not make their way into the Coker
decision. His reluctance to side with the dissenters seems just as
plausibly attributable to the problem of remedy and fears of
spillover to the noncapital side of the criminal-justice system
discussed above as to his need, in Justice Scalia's words, for
"more proof."260

The most dramatic consequences of the Court's silence
about race were neither contemplated nor foreseeable. Three
powerful strands of contemporary capital jurisprudence are
traceable to the Court's framing of its decisions in its early cases
and thus, in some ways, traceable to the Court's decision to bypass race. The first two strands are the robust requirement of
individualized sentencing261 and the accompanying heightened
representational requirements in capital trials.262 The Court's
decision in Maxwell and later in Furman to focus on the
problem of standardless discretion (rather than, say, racially

257
258

259
260
261
262

See Johnson, Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past at 196-200 (cited in note 26).
McCleskey, 481 US at 313.
See Johnson, Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past at 200 (cited in note 26).
Memorandum from Scalia (cited in note 255).
See McCleskey, 481 US at 297.
See Rompilla v Beard, 545 US 374, 387 (2005).
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discriminatory outcomes) has radically transformed capital
practice, but in ways that are themselves contingent, complex,
and unanticipated. The Court's regulatory intervention in
Furman required states to provide capital-sentencing guidelines
if they sought to retain the death penalty. Numerous jurisdictions, including North Carolina and Louisiana, pursued what
they regarded as the clearest and most definitive path in this
regard-the decision to make capital punishment mandatory for
certain crimes.263 When the Court rejected the mandatory statutes, it formally recognized, in unprecedented language, the significance of a defendant's character and background as well as
the circumstances of the offense to the death-penalty decision.264
That recognition not only required states to provide a meaningful vehicle for the consideration of mitigating evidence broadly
defined,265 but it also profoundly altered the way that institutional actors conceived of the responsibilities of trial counsel.266
Instead of treating capital cases like any other serious felonies,
capital-trial lawyers increasingly understand their special obligation to investigate and present a wide range of mitigating evidence. Such efforts require a capital-defense team, with psychiatric, psychological, and mitigation specialists, and these
heightened demands are reflected in both the increasingly specific professional norms promulgated by the American Bar
Association 267 and the Court's own doctrines elaborating the
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel as applied to capital
sentencing.268
The irony, of course, is that the Court's concern about the
absence of guidelines ultimately produced a much more substantial commitment to open-ended individualized sentencing. That

See Banner, The Death Penalty at 269 (cited in note 8).
See Woodson v North Carolina,428 US 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart) (plurality).
265 See, for example, Tennard v Dretke, 542 US 274, 288-89 (2004).
266 See Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization? Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment, 30 L & Inequality 211, 228 (2012).
267 Compare American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989) (former ABA guidelines), archived at
http://perma.cc/U3Q5-87HQ, with American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performanceof Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hofstra L Rev
913 (2003) (new ABA guidelines).
268 See, for example, Rompilla, 545 US at 387 (holding that the absence of an adequate mitigation investigation denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to effective representation); Wiggins v Smith, 539 US 510, 524-25 (2003) (same); Williams v
Taylor, 529 US 362, 396 (2000) (same).
263
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commitment has improved death-penalty representation, but it
has also proven extraordinarily costly. Contemporary capital
trials are far more expensive than their counterparts in the
1960s and 1970s, and those costs have increasingly destabilized
the practice.269 Capital prosecutions have declined dramatically
over the past fifteen years, and the costs associated with capitaltrial defense-commonly borne by local rather than state governments-have contributed significantly to the decline.270
Would a race-conscious or race-focused capital jurisprudence
have avoided these developments? If the Court had addressed
the racially discriminatory application of capital-rape statutes in
Rudolph or Maxwell, it might have alleviated some of the pressure to address the "arbitrary" and "freakish" aspects of the
American death penalty a few years later.271 It is difficult to assess, counterfactually, whether an early win on race grounds
would have contributed momentum to the sort of temporary abolition achieved in Furman (with the unexpected consequences
described above) or, on the other hand, would have defused a
continuing commitment by the LDF to attack, or the Court to
regulate, capital punishment.
The race avoidance in Coker produced a third powerful
strand of contemporary death-penalty law-the Court's proportionality doctrine. Prior to Coker, the Court had virtually no experience gauging whether particular punishments, though permissible generally, were excessive as applied to particular
offenses or offenders. And Coker could have avoided this difficult
enterprise by choosing a black defendant-white victim case and
ruling that the long-standing (and continuing) racial discrimination in capital-rape prosecutions required prohibiting the practice. Instead, the Court sought to assess proportionality by looking at "objective" indicia of prevailing values (state statutes and
jury decisionmaking) and consulting its own judgment regarding
the challenged practice and the purposes of punishment.272 That
proportionality approach yielded modest results in the first two
decades after Coker, with the Court upholding the death penalty
as applied to juveniles273 and persons with intellectual

269 See Steiker and Steiker, 30 L & Inequality at 231-33 (cited in note 266).
270 Steiker and Steiker, 2010 U Chi Legal F at 142 (cited in note 20).
271 See note 134 and accompanying text.
272 Coker, 433 US at 592.
273 Stanford v Kentucky, 492 US 361, 380 (1989).
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disabilities274 and carving a small layer of protection for
nontriggerpersons convicted under the law of parties.275 But the

past fifteen years have seen a dramatic expansion of the doctrine. The Court reversed the earlier denials of protection for juveniles276 and persons with intellectual disabilities277 and, in the
context of a defendant sentenced to death for child rape, condemned the application of capital punishment to nonhomicidal
ordinary crimes.278

More importantly, the Court's new proportionality jurisprudence has broadened the criteria for assessing prevailing
standards of decency, consulting professional and expert opinion, opinion polling data, and world practices and attitudes.279
This new methodology facilitated the Court's rejections of the
juvenile death penalty and the execution of the intellectually
disabled despite the fact that, in both cases, more death-penalty
states permitted the challenged practice than prohibited it (a
fact that would have been fatal under the Court's prior approach). In addition, the new methodology indicates a potential
route to judicial abolition, as each of the emerging factors increasingly weighs against the continued retention of the death
penalty writ large.280

In light of the unexpected growth of the individualization
requirement (and the accompanying extraordinary costs of capital representation), as well as the contemporary expansion of
the proportionality doctrine, the race avoidance of Rudolph,
Maxwell, Furman, and Coker might have yielded moresubstantial and intrusive regulation of state capital practices
than more-focused, race-based approaches. This dynamic is not
unfamiliar. In the wake of the Civil War, advocates for racial
justice sought explicit, simple declarations of racial equality in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866281 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
For example, Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, leader of the
Radical Republicans in the House of Representatives, proposed
Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302, 340 (1989).
See Enmund v Florida, 458 US 782, 788 (1982); Tison v Arizona, 481 US 137,
158 (1987).
276 Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 578-79 (2005).
277 Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304, 321 (2002).
278 Kennedy v Louisiana, 554 US 407, 446-47 (2008).
279 See Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform from the
American Experiment with Capital Punishment, 87 S Cal L Rev 733, 764 (2014).
274
275
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the following amendment: "All national and State laws shall be
equally applicable to every citizen, and no discrimination shall
be made on account of race and color."282 And an original proposal for the Civil Rights Act would have condemned any race
discrimination with respect to "civil rights or immunities.283
Concerns about the potentially broad implications of general
guarantees of racial equality (including their consequences for
antimiscegenation laws, segregation, and voting restrictions)
caused the Reconstruction-era Congress to ultimately embrace a
narrower, more targeted Civil Rights Act, safeguarding specific
rights of economic personhood.24 Those same concerns likely informed the choice to forgo Stevens's straightforward protection
against racial discrimination in favor of the vague, nonracial
language in the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects "privileges and immunities" from abridgement, assures "due process
of law" prior to deprivations of life, liberty, or property, and prohibits denials of "equal protection of the laws."285 The desire not
to intrude too much on racial prerogatives ultimately paved the
way for a dramatic expansion of the scope of liberty and equality
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment apart from race,
though it obviously came at the price of delaying (or at least contributing to the delay) for at least three-quarters of a century
the dismantling of Jim Crow.286 So too might race avoidance in
the capital punishment context produce more-enduring and intrusive regulation of capital punishment than the more-limited,
though more-threatening, race-based intervention that the
Court abjured.
CONCLUSION

The American death penalty is often described as exceptional. In the mid-nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville observed the relative mildness of the American death penalty, and
the decision of some American states to limit or abolish capital
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punishment put the United States ahead of its European counterparts. 2 7 Today, the United States is viewed as an outlier in
the other direction, chided for its barbarity as the sole Western
democracy that retains capital punishment. The United States
is also an outlier among current retentionist states in its extensive efforts to regulate and tame the practice. But perhaps the
most long-standing and consistent ground for distinction is the
extent to which the American death penalty is and has been
"soaked" in racism.288 The story of how the American death penalty came under assault in the 1960s, was almost judicially abolished in the early 1970s, and has been subject to continuing constitutional regulation thereafter cannot be told without detailed
attention to race. And yet the Supreme Court opinions addressing the American death penalty during this foundational era are
soaked in euphemism, addressing problems of "arbitrariness,"
"caprice," and "disproportionality." We have sought to illuminate
the causes and consequences of the Court's race avoidance. We
are confident that, whatever the future holds for the American
death penalty, its destiny is in some important sense linked to
the distinctive and destructive role of racial discrimination in
American society.
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